Denver magistrate separates mother from breastfeeding infant. Jail refuses pump, as they do common decency.


DENVER, COLORADO- A heartbreaking scene unfolded yesterday when Denver Magistrate Kate Boland decided to impose a $10,000 bond on a domestic violence detainee, against the recommendations of the husband (victim), the public defender, and even the city prosecutor, who all wanted the 35-yr-old mother of five released on personal recognizance. Most critical, no consideration was paid to the family’s month-old infant who is breastfeeding. Neither by Boland, nor the downtown detention center, known for its systemic disrespect for the rights and needs of its inmates.

You might not care how poorly criminals or their children are treated, but the inmates of jails are suspects, not convicts. They are unconvicted detainees held on some officer’s probable cause. They’re suspected of a crime, but have a right to a fair trial (under the 6th Amendment) and a right not to be punished before conviction (under the 14th). Depending on who calls 911, they could be YOU.

For those reasons (and the Golden Rule and the social contract), jails have to show a semblance of concern for the still innocent lives disrupted in their care. Denver’s Van Cise-Simonet Detention Center has a famously outlandish record in that regard. Marvin Booker and Michael Marshall are two well known extremes to which Denver sheriffs deputies have disrespected inmates’ lives. A rare survivor, Jamal Hunter, was awarded $3.25 million for beatings he received there. Unfortunately his settlement was contingent on burying the evidence of broader misconduct, thanks Jamal.

Those cases have generated reviews and reforms, but abuses persist. Isn’t it amazing that after repeated court-ordered overhauls, the public could still be told “the detention cenver has no protocols for breastfeeding mothers.”

Magistrate Boland made no allowance for the accused mother to maintain her feedings. After the morning hearing, friends learned the jail didn’t care to accomodate the mother either. That afternoon Baby Thomas became ill and began vomiting, so the father brought the baby to the visitor’s lobby hoping emergency visits could be arranged. The jail said no, though after some persuading, a sergeant agreed to convey a breastpump to the mother if one was supplied. A device was purchased and submitted, but the jail recinded their offer. This time a charge nurse named “Monica” explained she was under no obligation to comply, that she’d called her boss at Denver General who confirmed it. Without a court order, she said, the jail had no further responsibility.

By now activists with Denver Court Support were agitating online about the plight of Baby Thomas. The jail was innundated with telephone calls. The sheriffs cleared the public lobby, cancelled visitations, and put the facility in lockdown in anticipation of a rally.

Nevermind feeding Baby Thomas, release his mother immediately. Activists had raised the monies needed to hire a bondsman to post the bond. The jail was urged to expedite the mother’s release once bond was posted.

Shouldn’t inmates be release when they’ve paid to have their freedom? This is where the Van Cise-Simonet’s disrespect is arbitrary, punitive, and universal. Time to process inmates, either intake or release, takes forever, or just feels like it. Denver’s Van Cise-Simonet Detention Center likes to take a MINIMUM of 11 HOURS for these proceedures.

The pretext for the first delay is “for fingerprints to clear”. Enough time for INTERPOL in Timbuktu to review your prints and give the all clear, because they can’t be expected to be standing at the fax machine at all hours of the day, the jailers explain.

That step is required before a bond can be posted. Once a bond is paid, an inmate’s release requires a second computer delay. Also commonly at least eleven hours. The jailers attribute that wait to “that’s how long the system takes.”

On occasion we’ve seen public pressure result in a shortening of the release time. The upshot is the the release time appears to be at the jail’s whim. In the case of our breastfeeding mother the jail wouldn’t budge.

Worse for Baby Thomas’ mother, someone new to the bonding desk re-initiated the print clearing process instead of terminating it. She had to wait another interminable cycle.

The mother was taken into custody on Monday, her prints cleared by Tuesday morning. After the hearing in Room 2300, where the $10,000 bond was set, the bondsman tried to pay but learned he had to wait. The aforementioned administrative error meant it wouldn’t be before WEDNESDAY morning when her bond could be posted. Everyone is awaiting her release STILL.

As it stands, the mother is supposed to be fitted with an ankle bracelet by 8pm today. That will make it more than 48 hours that she’ll have been in custody. Mothers under stress withheld from feeding infants can stop lactating in less than that time.

The specifics of this domestic violence case are few. A neighbor called the police because the mother was seen holding a knife. The police chose to charge the mother and take her into custody. Who knows what the whole story is. The Denver Court Support activists didn’t get involved to solve the couple’s problems. Because that’s beside the point.

A child shouldn’t have to be harmed while authorities sort this out. An infant deprived of breastmilk suffers a calculable detriment which this magistrate and this jail could minimize, if they cared.

It’s hard to imagine anyone cares at Van Cise-Simonet. The jail is notorious for inedible food and poor health standards. The 23-hour lockdown is standard in all pods. Right now we hear that inmates are sleeping three to four in a cell which has only bunks for two. The one or two extra sleep on the concrete floor. This of course in addition to the litigated sadism of the Denver jailers.

Last night, outside the door of the jail, the Denver sheriffs deputies eventually re-admitted visitors into the lobby at 8pm, but kept the activists outside. Then deputies lined up and started warning the father’s friends to “calm down”. That warning and the posture of the deputies was recognizable to activists –and to many African Americans– as the precursor to the use of tasers. The only option was to leave.

UPDATE: The mother wasn’t able to rejoin her children until 10PM Wednesday. The baby is okay, although no doubt impacted by the interrupted feedings. At a public meeting the next evening to address law enforcement accountability to the community, activists told officials about what happened. They were told by the Denver Sheriff Patrick Firman that the jail DOES HAVE A POLICY to handle breastfeeding and that he was very sorry his employees didn’t know to tell the complainant.

Occupy v. Martinez (Plaza Protest Ban) 2016 US 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Decision AFFIRMING Prelim Injunction


Yesterday I published the federal judge’s order to grant the 2015 preliminary injunction against the Lindsey Flanigan Courthouse. Since that time the city motioned to dismiss, there were show cause hearings, and depositions, and an appeal to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 8, 2016 the appeals court AFFIRMED the preliminary injunction. As a result this legal action is on the road to becoming a permanent injunction, to be decided at trial this April. The prospects look promising, based on how the appelate judges schooled our First Amendment adversaries. I’m reprinting their full decision below.

In particular you might enjoy Judge McHugh’s citing of US Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts, writing in 1939 for the majority, in a decision to uphold public first amendment rights in Hague v. [AFL-]CIO. Robert affirmed that streets were traditional free speech areas:

“Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.”

Here’s the full 2016 opinion rejecting Denver’s appeal of our federal injunction:

Document: 01019599889 Date Filed: 04/08/2016

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

ERIC VERLO; JANET MATZEN; and FULLY INFORMED JURY ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs – Appellees,

v.

THE HONORABLE MICHAEL MARTINEZ, in his official capacity as Chief Judge of the Second Judicial District,

Defendant – Appellant,

v.

THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO, a municipality; ROBERT C. WHITE, in his official capacity as Denver Chief of Police,
Defendants – Appellees.

_______________

FILED ?United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit

April 8, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court

No. 15-1319

_________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado ?(D.C. No. 1:15-CV-01775-WJM-MJW)
_________________________________

Stephanie Lindquist Scoville, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Colorado, Denver, Colorado (Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General; Frederick R. Yarger, Solicitor General; Matthew D. Grove, Assistant Solicitor General; Ralph L. Carr, Colorado Judicial Center, Denver, Colorado, with her on the briefs) for Defendant – Appellant.

David A. Lane, Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs – Appellees.

Wendy J. Shea, Assistant City Attorney; Geoffrey C. Klingsporn, Assistant City Attorney; Evan P. Lee, Assistant City Attorney; Cristina Peña Helm, Assistant City Attorney, Denver City Attorney’s Office, Denver, Colorado, filed a brief on behalf of Defendants – Appellees.
_________________________________

Before BRISCOE, McKAY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________

McHUGH, Circuit Judge.
_________________________________

This is an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction, enjoining in part the enforcement of an administrative order (Order) issued by Defendant-Appellant Judge Michael Martinez, acting in his official capacity as Chief Judge of the Second Judicial District of Colorado (Judicial District). The Order prohibits all expressive activities within an area immediately surrounding the Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse in Denver (Courthouse). Plaintiffs-Appellees Eric Verlo, Janet Matzen, and the Fully Informed Jury Association (collectively, Plaintiffs) sought the preliminary injunction to stop enforcement of the Order against their expressive activities. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court enjoined enforcement of a portion of the Order as against Plaintiffs. The Judicial District now appeals.

Based on the arguments made and evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Plaintiffs’ motion in part. Although we affirm the district court’s order granting a limited preliminary injunction, we express no opinion as to whether a permanent injunction should issue. Instead, we provide guidance to the district court and the parties regarding the factual inquiry and the applicable legal standard relevant to that question on remand.

I. BACKGROUND

The genesis of this case is an incident involving nonparties. On July 27, 2015, two men were distributing pamphlets on the plaza outside the Courthouse (Plaza). The pamphlets contained information about jury nullification, a practice in which a jury refuses to convict a defendant despite legal evidence of guilt because the jury members believe the law at issue is immoral. 1 Both men were arrested and charged with jury tampering in violation of Colorado law. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-609(1) (“A person commits jury-tampering if, with intent to influence a jury’s vote, opinion, decision, or other action in a case, he attempts directly or indirectly to communicate with a juror other than as a part of the proceedings in the trial of the case.”).

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1 Jury nullification has been defined as “[a] jury’s knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to apply the law either because the jury wants to send a message about some social issue that is larger than the case itself or because the result dictated by law is contrary to the jury’s sense of justice, morality, or fairness.” Jury Nullification, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
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Plaintiffs, like the men who were arrested, wish to distribute literature relating to and advocating for jury nullification to individuals approaching the Courthouse who might be prospective jurors. Fearing they too would be subject to arrest, Plaintiffs brought suit against the City and County of Denver and Robert C. White, Denver’s police chief, in his official capacity (collectively, Denver) to establish their First Amendment right to engage in this activity. On the same day they filed suit, Plaintiffs also moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to restrain Defendants from taking action to prevent Plaintiffs from distributing jury nullification literature on the Plaza. Two days later, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to also challenge the Order issued by the Judicial District.

That Order, entitled Chief Judge Order Regarding Expressive Activities at the Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse, states in relevant part:

The Court has the responsibility and authority to ensure the safe and orderly use of the facilities of the Second Judicial District; to minimize activities which unreasonably disrupt, interrupt, or interfere with the orderly and peaceful conduct of court business in a neutral forum free of actual or perceived partiality, bias, prejudice, or favoritism; to provide for the fair and orderly conduct of hearings and trials; to promote the free flow of pedestrian and vehicular traffic on sidewalks and streets; and to maintain proper judicial decorum. Those having business with the courts must be able to enter and exit the Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse freely, in a safe and orderly fashion and unhindered by threats, confrontation, interference, or harassment. Accordingly, the Court hereby prohibits certain expressive activities on the grounds of the Courthouse, without regard to the content of any particular message, idea, or form of speech.

Prohibited Activities: The activities listed below shall be prohibited in the following areas: anywhere inside the Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse, including courtrooms, corridors, hallways, and lobbies; the areas, lawns, walkways, or roadways between the Courthouse and public sidewalks and roads; and any areas, walkways, or roadways that connect public sidewalks and roads to Courthouse entrances or exits. This includes, but is not limited to, the Courthouse entrance plaza areas on the east and west sides of the Courthouse as depicted in the highlighted areas of the attached map.

1. Demonstrating; picketing; protesting; marching; parading; holding vigils or religious services; proselytizing or preaching; distributing literature or other materials, or engaging in similar conduct that involves the communication or expression of views or grievances; soliciting sales or donations; or engaging in any commercial activity; unless specifically authorized in writing by administration; ?

2. Obstructing the clear passage, entry, or exit of law enforcement and emergency vehicles and personnel, Courthouse personnel, and other persons having business with the courts through Courthouse parking areas, entrances, and roadways to and from Courthouse and Courthouse grounds;

3. Erecting structures or other facilities, whether for a single proceeding or intended to remain in place until the conclusion of a matter; or placing tents, chairs, tables, or similar items on Courthouse grounds; except as specifically authorized in writing by administration; and ?

4. Using sound amplification equipment in a manner that harasses or interferes with persons entering or leaving Courthouse grounds or persons waiting in line to enter the Courthouse. ?

The Order was accompanied by an image depicting an aerial view of the Courthouse and its grounds, with the areas in which the Order prohibited expressive activity highlighted in yellow (Restricted Areas).

The Courthouse is bordered on its north side by Colfax Avenue and on its west side by Fox Street. Both Colfax Avenue and Fox Street have public sidewalks running along the perimeter of the Courthouse. Immediately to the east of the Courthouse lies the Plaza. The Plaza is bisected by Elati Street, which is closed to traffic other than police vehicles. Elati Street runs through a large circular area (Main Plaza) between the Courthouse and the Van Cise-Simonet Detention Center (Detention Center), which houses pretrial detainees. The Main Plaza contains planters, benches, public artwork, sidewalks, and gravel areas and is suitable for public gatherings.

Of relevance to this appeal are the Restricted Areas, which include an arc-shaped walkway and planter area immediately to the east of the Courthouse. The arced walkway runs from the corner of Elati Street and Colfax Avenue in a curved path across the front of the Courthouse and ends where it intersects with an open area in front of the Courthouse containing planters and benches (the Patio), which also forms part of the Restricted Areas. The Patio provides access to the main entrance on the east side of the Courthouse. Thus, the Restricted Areas encompass only the portions of the Plaza closest to the Courthouse.

The Judicial District opposed Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and, in doing so, defended the Order. In contrast, Denver entered into a joint stipulation (the Stipulation) with Plaintiffs. The Stipulation asserted that the entire Plaza between the Courthouse and the Detention Center—specifically including the Restricted Areas—was “a public forum and any content-based regulations must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest and reasonable time, place and manner regulations.” It further acknowledged that Plaintiffs were entitled to distribute jury nullification literature on the Plaza and pledged that Denver would not “arrest or otherwise charge Plaintiffs for handing out literature regarding jury nullification so long as Plaintiffs do not violate Colorado law or Denver’s Revised Municipal Code when they are handing out their literature.” The Stipulation specifically referenced the Judicial District’s Order, indicating Denver did not “intend to enforce [the Order] as written and will only impose content and viewpoint neutral reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on the use of the Plaza, and/or other exterior areas surrounding the Plaza if Denver determines that a compelling need exists to do so.”

At the preliminary injunction hearing, the parties called only two witnesses. Plaintiffs called Commander Antonio Lopez of the Denver Police Department. Commander Lopez described the Plaza as a public “open space” much like the city’s various parks. He testified that in the five years since the Courthouse opened he has witnessed “more First Amendment activity take place in [the Plaza] than [he] can recall.” Specifically, Commander Lopez described a variety of protest activities “at one point . . . averaging about two or three a week” in the Plaza. He further testified that the Denver Police Department had never taken steps to stop protest activity in the Plaza, other than intervening if protesters became violent or otherwise broke the law. Relevant to this appeal, Commander Lopez testified that in his experience, the entire Plaza—including the Restricted Areas—has traditionally been used for First Amendment protest activities. On cross-examination, Commander Lopez acknowledged that the “majority” of the protests in the Plaza occurred closer to the Detention Center, but that he had also seen protests directed at the Courthouse.

The Judicial District called Steven Steadman, administrator of judicial security for Colorado. Mr. Steadman testified that the Order was motivated by concern about anticipated protests of a verdict in a death penalty case being tried at the Courthouse.?Mr. Steadman explained that he met with Chief Judge Martinez to discuss security concerns relating to that verdict and recommended the Judicial District adopt a policy similar to one recently implemented in Arapahoe County during another high-profile capital trial.

Mr. Steadman also testified about the design of the Plaza, including the Restricted Areas. He indicated that the planters, gravel areas, and sidewalks were intentionally designed to “signal to the average user how to find their way, and where you should go and what the main travel ways are.” Mr. Steadman explained that the Patio and arced walkway’s “sole purpose is to allow people, the public, to enter and exit the [Courthouse] without being interfered with.” But Mr. Steadman also stated that, prior to imposition of the Order, protestors—including pamphleteers—were allowed to protest immediately in front of the doors to the Courthouse, provided they did not interfere with ingress or egress from the Courthouse. He explained that the “general response” of protestors was to cease their activities when requested by Courthouse security not to interfere with public access to the Courthouse. Mr. Steadman further testified that no person had ever been arrested for blocking ingress or egress from the Courthouse since it opened in 2010. Important to this appeal, Mr. Steadman acknowledged that Plaintiffs’ activities of passing out jury nullification literature did not present “any security risk” beyond what had previously been tolerated without incident throughout the time the Courthouse had been open.

The district court also accepted a proffer of Plaintiffs’ testimony, indicating that their intent was to approach people entering the Courthouse to discuss quietly the concept of jury nullification and to distribute their literature. Plaintiffs asserted that proximity to the front door of the Courthouse was key to their message because otherwise their intended audience—“people who are going to serve or are in fact serving on juries”—will “very frequently just bypass them” in the designated free speech zone by “walking on one of the sidewalks that is part of the [Restricted Areas].” By contrast, positioning themselves near the front door would allow Plaintiffs “to pass out literature to anyone who wants it” and “if people want to stop and talk about [it], they can then explain to them what the concept of jury nullification is.” Thus, according to Plaintiffs, the Order effectively prevented them from reaching their target audience. Finally, the district court accepted the parties’ jointly stipulated exhibits, which consisted of a series of images of the Plaza and Restricted Areas, as well as a copy of the Order.

Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court granted Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. In doing so, the district court relied on Denver’s Stipulation that the Plaza was a public forum and the Judicial District’s position that resolving the forum status was not necessary because the Order “would satisfy even the strictest test.” The district court concluded Plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits because, treating the Restricted Areas as public fora, the Order’s complete ban on expressive activity was not narrowly tailored to accomplish a significant government interest.

Accordingly, the district court entered a carefully circumscribed preliminary injunction in favor of Plaintiffs. Specifically, the district court enjoined enforcement of Paragraph 1 of the Order against Plaintiffs “to the extent he or she is otherwise lawfully seeking to distribute and/or orally advocate the message contained in [Plaintiffs’ pamphlets]” in the Restricted Areas. But the district court expressly left the remainder of the Order in place.

Following entry of the preliminary injunction, the Judicial District moved to stay the injunction pending appeal pursuant to Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In its motion to stay, the Judicial District introduced evidence that— subsequent to entry of the preliminary injunction—protesters had “descended on the Courthouse Plaza” and engaged in a pattern of disruptive and inappropriate behavior, including erecting canopies, harassing citizens seeking to enter the Courthouse, damaging the Courthouse landscaping, yelling and taunting court personnel, and posting signs in the planters and on the flagpoles in the Plaza. The Judicial District argued that a stay of the injunction was appropriate because protesters had been “emboldened” by the injunction to violate even the portions of the Order not subject to the injunction, thereby irreparably harming the Judicial District. The district court declined to stay the injunction, finding the Judicial District had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on appeal because the harm identified was not caused by the injunction. The district court reasoned the Judicial District and Denver were free to enforce the Order against the parties engaging in the complained-of disruptive behavior because such behavior was unlawful and not protected by the narrow injunction issued by the court with respect to Plaintiffs’ activities only.

The Judicial District now appeals. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we affirm.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, the Judicial District raises two arguments. First, it asserts the district court erred when it concluded the Plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success in establishing the Restricted Areas are public fora. Second, the Judicial District argues the district court incorrectly applied strict scrutiny when evaluating the Order. As a result, the Judicial District asks this court to reverse the district court’s entry of the preliminary injunction and remand for further proceedings.

We review the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Mo. v. Moser, 747 F.3d 814, 822 (10th Cir. 2014). “A district court abuses its discretion when it commits an error of law or makes clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id.

A. Scope of Review

Before addressing the merits of the parties’ arguments, we pause to clarify the scope of our review. The district court granted a narrow preliminary injunction drafted to address Plaintiffs’ First Amendment concerns related to their specific expressive activities. Although Plaintiffs asked the district court to prohibit enforcement of the entire Order, the court enjoined only the first paragraph, which imposes a complete ban on First Amendment activities—picketing, pamphleteering, protesting—within the Restricted Areas. The district court left in place the rest of the Order, including the prohibitions against obstructing Courthouse entrances, erecting structures, and using sound amplification equipment in the Restricted Areas.

The district court further limited the scope of the preliminary injunction by enjoining the first paragraph of the Order only as to Plaintiffs’ specific pamphleteering activities. In fact, the court enjoined enforcement of the Order only as to Plaintiffs’ distribution and discussion of two specifically identified pamphlets. The Judicial District remains free to enforce the first paragraph of the Order—even against Plaintiffs—for all other First Amendment activities within the Restricted Areas.

Finally, the district court limited the geographic scope of the injunction. Although the Order prohibits First Amendment activity both inside and outside the Courthouse, the district court enjoined enforcement of Paragraph 1 as to Plaintiffs only outside the Courthouse, leaving the entirety of the Order intact within the Courthouse. And the district court did not enjoin enforcement of any part of the Order within those portions of the Restricted Areas dedicated to Courthouse landscaping and security features. Thus, the Order continues to prohibit all expressive activity in the planter boxes or other landscaping and in the gravel security areas. Accordingly, the features of the Restricted Area to which the preliminary injunction applies are limited to (1) the arced walkway running south from Colfax Avenue between the gravel security area (to the west of the walkway) and a raised planter (to the east of the walkway) and ending at the Patio area at the main entrance on the east side of the Courthouse; 2 and (2) the Patio area at the main entrance. 3

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2 As discussed, the Order’s prohibition on expressive activities in the planter and gravel security areas were not enjoined by the district court.

3 The evidence presented about the geographic layout and physical features of the Restricted Area consisted primarily of approximately fifteen photographs. Because the record contains little testimony about the photographs, we rely on our own review of them to describe the Restricted Areas. In particular, it is unclear whether and to what extent the Restricted Areas include the sidewalk running along Fox Street on the west side of the Courthouse. The exhibit appears to highlight some areas of the sidewalk, but counsel for the Judicial District conceded at oral argument that it would be “constitutionally questionable” to prevent speech on a public sidewalk, and then indicated “[t]hat is precisely why the order here does not extend that far.” Therefore, we do not treat the Fox Street sidewalk as part of the Restricted Areas for purposes of our analysis.
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Our task in this appeal is to determine whether the district court abused its discretion when, based on the record before it at the preliminary injunction hearing, it issued this narrow, targeted injunction. But the Judicial District asks us to consider events occurring after the preliminary injunction hearing to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction. Specifically, the Judicial District points to evidence introduced during the Rule 62(c) hearing on the motion to stay the injunction pending appeal, which indicated that following the injunction, protestors had engaged in a series of inappropriate and disruptive behaviors. Some of these behaviors included harassing court personnel seeking to enter the Courthouse, erecting canopies and signs, and trampling Courthouse landscaping. According to the Judicial District, these post-injunction events demonstrate the “concrete concerns” motivating the creation of the Restricted Areas and therefore should have been considered by the district court.

Although we share the Judicial District’s concern about the disruptions created by some protestors following issuance of the injunction, these post-injunction events are not relevant to our resolution of this interlocutory appeal for two reasons. First, this evidence relates to events occurring after the preliminary injunction issued, and therefore none of it was presented to the district court at the hearing. We will not hold that the district court abused its discretion based on evidence not before it when it ruled. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting the general principle, in the context of de novo review of a summary judgment disposition, that we conduct our review “from the perspective of the district court at the time it made its ruling, ordinarily limiting our review to the materials adequately brought to the attention of the district court by the parties”); Theriot v. Par. of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 491 n.26 (5th Cir. 1999) (“An appellate court may not consider . . . facts which were not before the district court at the time of the challenged ruling.”). Cf. Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555, 1569 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e will not reverse the grant of summary judgment . . . based on evidence not before the district court.”). Accordingly, our review is limited to the evidence before the district court at the time of the preliminary injunction hearing, and we will not consider post-injunction events.

Second, even if we were to consider the post-decision evidence, it would not alter our analysis. The evidence the Judicial District relies on to demonstrate the negative effects of the preliminary injunction, in fact, does not implicate the injunction at all. As discussed, the preliminary injunction enjoins enforcement of Paragraph 1 of the Order specifically against Plaintiffs’ pamphleteering activities in certain parts of the Restricted Areas. The district court expressly allowed the Judicial District to continue enforcing the entire Order as to all other parties and all other First Amendment activities in the Restricted Areas. Importantly, the preliminary injunction does not affect the Judicial District’s ability to enforce the Order against any protestors, including the Plaintiffs, who engage in disruptive behaviors. For example, the injunction does not prohibit the Judicial District from taking action against protestors who obstruct Courthouse entrances, damage the Courthouse landscaping, or erect structures. All of this behavior remained prohibited by the Order after issuance of the injunction. In short, nothing in the preliminary injunction before us on appeal interferes with the Judicial District’s or Denver’s ability to enforce the Order against anyone, including Plaintiffs, engaging in such behavior.

The evidence of post-injunction bad behavior of some protestors may be relevant on remand to a motion to modify the injunction4 or to the district court’s ultimate decision on whether to issue a permanent injunction. But for the purposes of this appeal, we limit our review to the evidence before the district court at the time it issued the preliminary injunction.

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4 As the district court noted, the Judicial District did not move to modify the preliminary injunction based on changed circumstances. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) (allowing a party to obtain relief from a judgment or order when “applying [the judgment or order] prospectively is no longer equitable”); Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447 (2009) (noting that under Rule 60(b)(5) “[t]he party seeking relief bears the burden of establishing that changed circumstances warrant relief”).
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B. Abuse of Discretion

We now turn our attention to the question of whether the district court abused its discretion when it issued the preliminary injunction.

To obtain a preliminary injunction the moving party must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that the moving party will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (3) the balance of equities is in the moving party’s favor; and (4) the preliminary injunction is in the public interest.

Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1092 (10th Cir. 2013). In the First Amendment context, “the likelihood of success on the merits will often be the determinative factor” because of the seminal importance of the interests at stake. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1145 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1190 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”).

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the second, third, and fourth factors weighed in Plaintiffs’ favor.

Here, the district court found the second (irreparable harm), third (balance of equities), and fourth (public interest) factors weighed in Plaintiffs’ favor in light of the important First Amendment interests at stake. As an initial matter, the Judicial District has not challenged the district court’s determination as to these factors beyond a single footnote in its opening brief stating it had challenged them before the district court. A party’s offhand reference to an issue in a footnote, without citation to legal authority or reasoned argument, is insufficient to present the issue for our consideration. See San Juan Citizens All. v. Stiles, 654 F.3d 1038, 1055–56 (10th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, the Judicial District has waived any challenge to the district court’s findings related to the elements of irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest. But even if the Judicial District had properly challenged these factors on appeal, we would nevertheless affirm the district court’s conclusion that they weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor.

The Supreme Court has instructed that “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); see also Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1131 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[W]hen an alleged constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.”). There is no dispute that Plaintiffs’ pamphleteering constitutes First Amendment activity. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2536 (2014) (recognizing that one-on-one communication and leafletting are First Amendment-protected activities). And the Judicial District does not dispute that the Order would bar Plaintiffs from engaging in their pamphleteering in the Restricted Areas. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the factor of irreparable harm weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor.

The third factor—balance of equities—also tips in Plaintiffs’ favor. Before the district court, Plaintiffs proffered testimony that the Order would substantially impair their ability to convey their intended message to their target audience because it would prevent Plaintiffs from approaching potential jurors and engaging in a meaningful discussion of jury nullification. The district court also heard testimony from Mr. Steadman that Plaintiffs’ distribution of jury nullification literature and one-on-one discussions with potential jurors did not present a security risk. And the Judicial District presented no evidence that Plaintiffs’ activities otherwise interfered with Courthouse functions. On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the balance of equities weighed in favor of Plaintiffs. See Awad, 670 F.3d at 1132 (“Delayed implementation of a [governmental] measure that does not appear to address any immediate problem will generally not cause material harm, even if the measure were eventually found to be constitutional and enforceable.”).

As to whether the preliminary injunction is in the public interest, we agree with the district court that “it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Pac. Frontier v. Pleasant Grove City, 414 F.3d 1221, 1237 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Vindicating First Amendment freedoms is clearly in the public interest.”). The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the public interest was served by issuing the preliminary injunction to prevent the violation of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.

Thus, we agree the second, third, and fourth factors weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor. The only remaining question, then, is whether the district court abused its discretion in finding Plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. 5 Specifically, we must determine whether the Order violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to distribute jury nullification pamphlets and engage in one-on-one conversations with individuals entering and leaving the Courthouse.

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5 The Tenth Circuit has modified the preliminary injunction test when the moving party demonstrates that the second, third, and fourth factors “tip strongly” in its favor. See Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Int’l Registration Plan, Inc., 455 F.3d 1107, 1113 (10th Cir. 2006). “In such situations, the moving party may meet the requirement for showing success on the merits by showing that questions going to the merits are so serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful as to make the issue ripe for litigation and deserving of more deliberate investigation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But because we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, we need not decide whether this more lenient test applies.
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2. On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.

To demonstrate a violation of their First Amendment rights, Plaintiffs must first establish that their activities are protected by the First Amendment. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985). If so, a court must identify whether the challenged restrictions impact a public or nonpublic forum, because that determination dictates the extent to which the government can restrict First Amendment activities within the forum. See id. Finally, courts must determine whether the proffered justifications for prohibiting speech in the forum satisfy the requisite standard of review. Id. We address each element in turn.

a. Plaintiffs’ activities are protected by the First Amendment

The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that pamphleteering and one-on-one communications are First-Amendment-protected activities. See McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2536. The Court “observed that one-on-one communication is the most effective, fundamental, and perhaps economical avenue of political discourse” and that “no form of speech is entitled to greater constitutional protection” than leafletting. Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The Court went on to state, “[w]hen the government makes it more difficult to engage in these modes of communication, it imposes an especially significant First Amendment burden.” Id. Thus, Plaintiffs’ activities are protected by the First Amendment.

b. The district court did not abuse its discretion by assuming for purposes of analysis that the Restricted Areas are public fora

To properly place the district court’s decision in context, we begin with a brief discussion of the significance of forum status to the protection afforded under the First Amendment to public speech on government property. We then review the argument presented by the Judicial District to the district court regarding the forum status of the Restricted Areas here. Because the Judicial District either made a strategic decision to forgo any argument that the Restricted Areas are nonpublic fora, or inadequately presented that argument to the district court, we conclude the argument is waived. As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion by scrutinizing the Order under public forum analysis for purposes of the preliminary injunction motion.

Turning now to the constitutional restrictions on speech, our analysis is guided by Plaintiffs’ wish to engage in First Amendment-protected activity on government property. “Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker’s activities.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799–800. But in some instances, the public may have acquired by tradition or prior permission the right to use government property for expressive purposes. See id. at 802. To determine when and to what extent the Government may properly limit expressive activity on its property, the Supreme Court has adopted a range of constitutional protections that varies depending on the nature of the government property, or forum. Id. at 800.

The Court has identified three types of speech fora: the traditional public forum, the designated public forum, and the nonpublic forum. Id. at 802. Traditional public fora are places that by long tradition have been open to public assembly and debate. See id.; Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“At one end of the spectrum are streets and parks which ‘have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.’” (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939))). In these traditional public fora, the government’s right to “limit expressive activity [is] sharply circumscribed.” Id. A designated public forum is public property, not constituting a traditional public forum, which the government has intentionally opened to the public for expressive activity. Id. The government is not required to retain the open character of the property indefinitely, but “as long as it does so, it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.” Id. at 46. If the property is not a traditional public forum and it has not been designated as a public forum, it is a nonpublic forum. “Access to a nonpublic forum . . . can be restricted as long as the restrictions are ‘reasonable and are not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.’” 6 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (brackets omitted) (quoting Perry Educ., 460 U.S. at 46).

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6 Not relevant to this appeal, the Supreme Court has also recognized that the government can create a “limited public forum” by allowing “selective access to some speakers or some types of speech in a nonpublic forum,” while not opening “the property sufficiently to become a designated public forum.” Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 916 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995)).
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Because the nature of the forum dictates the standard of scrutiny with which restrictions on speech are reviewed, courts typically begin the analysis of a challenge to restrictions on speech involving government property by identifying the nature of the forum involved. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1128 (10th Cir. 2012). But the procedural posture of this appeal restricts the scope of our inquiry. That is, we need not determine whether the Restricted Areas are, in fact, public or nonpublic fora to resolve this interlocutory appeal. Rather, our task is to determine whether the district court abused its discretion when it found, based on the evidence and arguments presented, that Plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 261 (10th Cir. 1981) (“It is only necessary that plaintiffs establish a reasonable probability of success, and not an ‘overwhelming’ likelihood of success, in order for a preliminary injunction to issue.”). Because the Judicial District waived any argument that the Restricted Areas are nonpublic fora, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by evaluating the Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success under the scrutiny applicable to public fora.

To explain our rationale for this conclusion, we track the evolution of the Judicial District’s arguments in the district court regarding the forum status of the Restricted Areas. Plaintiffs argued in their motion for preliminary injunction that the entire Plaza, including the Restricted Areas, constitutes a traditional public forum. Denver also stipulated with Plaintiffs that the Plaza is a public forum.

In response to the motion for preliminary injunction, the Judicial District claimed Plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on the merits of their First Amendment claim because “[i]rrespective of Denver’s view of the courthouse plaza, it is not a traditional public forum. And even if it were, the [Order] comes nowhere near banning all expressive activity in that area. To the contrary, it is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction.” But the Judicial District did not then provide any support for its assertion that the Plaza is not a public forum. Rather, it first claimed that Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Order and then continued its argument under the heading, “This Court need not decide whether the plaza is a traditional public forum for the purposes of this proceeding.” Under that heading, the Judicial District asserted that the Stipulation between the Plaintiffs and Denver did not bind the Judicial District or the district court and that therefore “[t]he status of the plaza is an open question.” But, again, rather than present argument on the correct forum status of the Plaza or ask the district court to reach a contrary conclusion, the Judicial District stated the district court need not identify the precise forum status of the Restricted Areas “because [the Order] would satisfy even the strictest test.” That is, the Judicial District claimed that “[e]ven if Plaintiffs were correct that the entire plaza is a traditional public forum,” and thus subject to a higher standard of review, the Order was constitutional as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. The Judicial District maintained this tactical approach through oral argument on the motion for a preliminary injunction.

After the close of evidence at the hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court attempted to clarify the Judicial District’s position:

THE COURT: In your briefing the Attorney General took the position that it doesn’t matter whether the area in question is a public forum or a non-public forum area, because the Attorney General believes that you can establish the grounds necessary under the standards to apply in either case.

JUDICIAL DIST.: To be clear, our position is that this is not a public forum. However, that is a factually intensive question that I don’t think the Court has been presented with sufficient evidence to decide today.

THE COURT: Well, I have a stipulation from the owner of the property that it is a public forum area.

JUDICIAL DIST.: I understand that. I don’t think that binds either [the Judicial District] or this Court.

THE COURT: Well, that’s something I need to decide, right?

JUDICIAL DIST.: Not necessarily.

THE COURT: Okay. But here’s what I am getting at. Your position is, whether it’s public or non-public, you believe that the . . . Plaza Order . . . is sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the concerns of ingress and egress to the courthouse and threat to the public safety. Is that your position?

JUDICIAL DIST.: Yes. Our position is that the order satisfies time, place, and manner requirements. . . .

The discussion then proceeded under the assumption that the Order impacted a public forum and therefore had to be narrowly tailored. Recall that the government has broad discretion to restrict expressive activity in a nonpublic forum, irrespective of whether the restrictions are narrowly tailored. Perry Educ., 460 U.S. at 46. But, as will be discussed in more detail below, even content-neutral restrictions on speech in a public forum—whether a traditional public forum or a designated public forum—must be narrowly tailored to advance a significant government interest. See id. at 45–46.

Consistent with its acquiescence to the district court’s application of a public forum analysis at the preliminary injunction stage, the Judicial District limited its oral argument on the motion for preliminary injunction to the proper definition of “narrowly- tailored.” Tellingly, the Judicial District provided no argument relevant to whether the Restricted Area was, in fact, a public forum, or that the restrictions did not have to be narrowly tailored at all because they impacted only nonpublic fora. Instead, the Judicial District conceded that the evidence was insufficient to allow the district court to determine the forum status of the Restricted Areas. But it claimed the district court could proceed to the merits under a public forum analysis nevertheless, because the result would be the same whether the Restricted Areas were public or nonpublic fora. That is, the Judicial District argued the district court could assume for purposes of analysis that the Restricted Areas are public fora. And the district court did as suggested in its Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

In the Preliminary Injunction Order’s discussion of the likelihood that Plaintiffs will succeed on the merits, the district court discussed forum in a section titled, “Is the Courthouse Plaza a Public Forum?” In this section, the district court considered the significance of the nature of the forum, the disagreement between Denver and the Judicial District on that issue, and the Stipulation between Denver and Plaintiffs that the Restricted Areas are public fora. Relying in part on the Stipulation, the district court concluded Plaintiffs are “likely to prevail in their claim that the Courthouse Plaza is at least a designated public forum, if not a traditional public forum.” But the district court also notes “the Second Judicial District has not specifically argued for a finding that the Courthouse Plaza is a nonpublic forum. Rather, it says that ‘resolving [the type of forum at issue] is not necessary for the purposes of this proceeding because the [Plaza Order] would satisfy even the strictest test.’”

Our review of the record is consistent with the district court’s assessment of the Judicial District’s argument. During the briefing and argument to the district court in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, the Judicial District never provided legal argument supporting its conclusory statement that the Restricted Areas are nonpublic fora. As noted, it instead indicated the forum status of the Plaza was an open question the district court need not decide, and further conceded it was a question the district court could not decide based on the evidence presented. In sum, the Judicial District made the strategic decision to accept Plaintiffs’ characterization of the Restricted Areas as a public forum for purposes of analysis and to present only an argument that the Order is constitutional under the scrutiny applicable to restrictions of speech in public fora. And the Judicial District maintained that position throughout the district court proceedings.

The Judicial District filed a motion in the district court to stay the injunction pending appeal, in which it stated “courthouse plazas are not traditional public fora,” and cited, without further analysis, Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2015), a new decision at the time holding the plaza of the Supreme Court building is not a public forum. But again, the Judicial District did not seek a ruling that the Restricted Areas are nonpublic fora or provide reasoned analysis to support such a claim. Consistent with its earlier strategy, the Judicial District argued that “even if the [Courthouse Plaza] were a traditional public forum,” the district court applied the wrong level of scrutiny. Significantly, the Judicial District never claimed it could bar or reasonably restrict speech in the Restricted Areas because they were nonpublic fora; it argued the district court had erred because “[s]trict scrutiny applies only to content-based restrictions on speech in a public forum.”

For the first time on appeal, the Judicial District provides substantive argument for the claim that the Restricted Areas are nonpublic fora and, therefore, the district court should have considered only whether the content-neutral restrictions contained in the Order were reasonable. When a party pursues a new legal theory for the first time on appeal, we usually refuse to consider it. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1127–28 (10th Cir. 2011); Lone Star Steel Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 851 F.2d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Ordinarily, a party may not lose in the district court on one theory of the case, and then prevail on appeal on a different theory.”).

As noted, the Judicial District was aware of the “open question” with respect to the forum status of the Restricted Areas but made the strategic decision to forgo presenting meaningful argument on this point. In its response brief to Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction filed with the district court, the Judicial District cited three cases in support of its statement that the forum question remains open. But it provided no argument incorporating those decisions into a cogent legal analysis of the Restricted Areas as nonpublic fora. See United States v. Wooten, 377 F.3d 1134, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004) (“The court will not consider such issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And although forum status is a fact-intensive inquiry, the Judicial District failed to explain how the particular facts here color that analysis. Cf. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (providing that appellant’s opening brief must contain an argument section that includes “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies”).

Thus, the Judicial District has waived this issue, at least for purposes of our review of the preliminary injunction order. Richison, 634 F.3d at 1127 (explaining that if a party intentionally chooses not to pursue an argument before the district court, “we usually deem it waived and refuse to consider it”). 7 And the forum status issue is not properly before us even if we generously conclude the Judicial District presented alternative arguments to the district court that (1) the Restricted Areas are not public fora; or (2) even if the Restricted Areas are public fora, the Order can survive the applicable level of scrutiny. Although the Judicial District presented cogent legal argument on the second issue, it failed to present reasoned argument on the first to the district court. See Ark Initiative v. U.S. Forest Serv., 660 F.3d 1256, 1263 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that the “scant discussion” of an issue in the district court “appear[ed] as an afterthought, and [did] not meet the standard for preserving an issue for review”).

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7 Even if this argument had been merely forfeited, it would nevertheless be an inappropriate basis for reversal because the Judicial District has not argued plain error. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir. 2011) (“And the failure to do so —the failure to argue for plain error and its application on appeal— surely marks the end of the road for an argument for reversal not first presented to the district court.”). Nor are we inclined to exercise our discretion to consider the forum status issue despite the failure to raise it to the district court because we agree with the Judicial District that the preliminary injunction record is inadequate for that purpose. Cf. Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1244–45 (10th Cir. 2015) (exercising discretion to consider forfeited argument on “clearly established” prong of qualified immunity).
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Our conclusion that the Judicial District failed to adequately present this issue to the district court is further supported by the district court’s view that “the Second Judicial District ha[d] not specifically argued for a finding that the Courthouse Plaza is a nonpublic forum.” Id. (“Not surprisingly, the district court never addressed” the issue.). Accordingly, the argument that the Restricted Areas are nonpublic fora was waived either by the Judicial District’s strategic decision not to present it, or by the Judicial District’s failure to adequately brief the issue. As such, the district court’s application of a public forum analysis is not a legitimate ground on which to reverse the preliminary injunction order.

We now address the only other challenge the Judicial District makes to the preliminary injunction: that the district court abused its discretion by applying the wrong test, even if the Restricted Areas are public fora.

c. The district court did not apply the wrong standard to the content-neutral restrictions imposed by the Order

Having determined the district court did not abuse its discretion by treating the Restricted Areas as public fora for purposes of analysis, we next consider whether the district court abused its discretion when it found Plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the question of whether the Order violated their constitutional rights under the relevant First Amendment standards. 8 In a public forum, the government cannot ban all expressive activity. Perry Educ., 460 U.S. at 45. But even in a public forum, the government can restrict speech through “content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions that: (a) serve a significant government interest; (b) are narrowly tailored to advance that interest; and (c) leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” Doe, 667 F.3d at 1130–31. Content-based restrictions, however, “must satisfy strict scrutiny, that is, the restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.” Summum, 555 U.S. at 469.

The Judicial District argues the district court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard. Specifically, the Judicial District contends the district court applied the stringent strict scrutiny analysis reserved for content-based restrictions. And because the Order imposes only content-neutral restrictions, the Judicial District claims this was an abuse of discretion. Although we agree the restrictions are content-neutral, we are not convinced the district court applied the more stringent standard applicable to content-based restrictions.

The district court explained that under the relevant standard, “[t]he state may . . . enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which [1] are content- neutral, [2] are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and [3] leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” On its face, then, the district court appears to have invoked the correct legal standard. Cf. Doe, 667 F.3d at 1130–31 (same). Nevertheless, the Judicial District argues that in considering whether the restrictions are “narrowly tailored,” the district court inappropriately applied the more demanding standard applicable to content-based regulations.

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8 “Government restrictions on speech in a designated public forum are subject to the same strict scrutiny as restrictions in a traditional public forum.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009). Thus, our analysis does not turn on whether the Restricted Areas are considered traditional or designated public fora.
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The term “narrowly tailored” appears in the tests for both content-based and content-neutral regulations on speech. See Doe, 667 F.3d at 1130–31 (indicating a content-neutral regulation must be “narrowly tailored” to advance a significant government interest); Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 469 (stating that content-based restrictions “must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest”) (emphasis added)). And, as the Judicial District correctly notes, there are subtle differences in the way courts apply the concept of narrow tailoring in the two contexts. For the purposes of a content-neutral regulation, “the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation, and does not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.” Wells v. City & Cty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1148 (10th Cir. 2001) (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, a content-based restriction is narrowly tailored only if it is the least restrictive means of achieving the government’s compelling objective. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).

According to the Judicial District, the district court considered alternatives to the Order that might have been employed to achieve the Judicial District’s objectives, and such consideration proves the district court applied the “least restrictive means” standard. In the Judicial District’s view, any inquiry into alternative means of achieving the government objective is inappropriate where, like here, the restrictions are content-neutral, rather than content-based, and thus not subject to the least restrictive alternative form of narrow tailoring. We disagree.

The Supreme Court has not discouraged courts from considering alternative approaches to achieving the government’s goals when determining whether a content- neutral regulation is narrowly tailored to advance a significant government interest. Although the Court has held that a content-neutral regulation “need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the government’s interests,” it has also explained that “the government still may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.” McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2535 (internal quotation marks omitted). And when considering content-neutral regulations, the Court itself has examined possible alternative approaches to achieving the government’s objective to determine whether the government’s chosen approach burdens substantially more speech than necessary. Id. at 2537–39. That is, the government may not “forgo[] options that could serve its interests just as well,” if those options would avoid “substantially burdening the kind of speech in which [Plaintiffs’] wish to engage.” Id. at 2537; id. at 2539 (“The point is not that [the government] must enact all or even any of the proposed [alternative approaches]. The point is instead that the [government] has available to it a variety of approaches that appear capable of serving its interests, without excluding individuals from areas historically open for speech and debate.”). Thus, “[t]o meet the requirement of narrow tailoring [in the context of content-neutral regulations], the government must demonstrate that alternative measures that burden substantially less speech would fail to achieve the government’s interests, not simply that the chosen route is easier.” Id. at 2540.

As a result, we cannot conclude the district court applied the wrong legal standard merely because it considered whether the Judicial District had options other than the complete ban on speech contained in Paragraph 1 of the Order that would equally serve its interests. We now turn our attention to whether, under the standard applicable to content-neutral regulations in a public forum, the district court abused its discretion when it found Plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the question of whether the Order survives constitutional scrutiny.

d. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits

As discussed, for purposes of the preliminary injunction analysis, the Judicial District acquiesced in the district court’s acceptance of Plaintiffs’ characterization, and Denver’s Stipulation, that the Restricted Areas are public fora. Under that assumption, we can easily conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that a complete ban of their expressive activities violates the First Amendment. Our resolution of this issue is informed by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in McCullen, which is highly analogous.

In McCullen, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a state law creating thirty-five-foot buffer zones around the entrances of facilities where abortions are performed. Id. at 2525. The McCullen plaintiffs wished to approach and talk to women outside such facilities —to engage in “sidewalk counseling”— in an attempt to dissuade the women from obtaining abortions. Id. at 2527. The buffer zones forced the McCullen plaintiffs away from their preferred positions outside the clinics’ entrances, thereby hampering their sidewalk counseling efforts. Id. at 2527–28. The McCullen plaintiffs brought suit, arguing the buffer zones restricted their First Amendment rights and seeking to enjoin enforcement of the statute creating the buffer zones. Id. at 2528. After the First Circuit upheld the statute as a reasonable content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id.

The Court began its analysis by recognizing that the buffer-zone statute operated to restrict speech in traditional public fora: streets and sidewalks. Id. at 2529. It then held the buffer-zone statute was a content-neutral restriction because violations of the act depended not on what the plaintiffs said, but on where they said it. Id. at 2531 (“Indeed, petitioners can violate the Act merely by standing in a buffer zone, without displaying a sign or uttering a word.”). The Court then proceeded to apply the test for content-neutral restrictions in a public forum, assessing whether the buffer-zone statute was “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” Id. at 2534. Because the plaintiffs had not challenged the significance of the government’s asserted interests, the Court’s analysis largely focused on the question of whether the statute was narrowly tailored to serve that interest.

The Court noted the buffer zones placed serious burdens on the plaintiffs’ speech activities. Id. at 2535. Specifically, by preventing the plaintiffs from engaging in quiet, one-on-one conversations about abortion and distributing literature, the buffer zones “operate[d] to deprive petitioners of their two primary methods of communicating with patients.” Id. at 2536. Although the First Amendment does not guarantee a right to any particular form of speech, the Supreme Court explained that some forms of speech -one-on-one conversation and leafletting on public sidewalks— “have historically been more closely associated with the transmission of ideas than others.” Id. The Court held that “[w]hen the government makes it more difficult to engage in [one-on-one communication and leafletting], it imposes an especially significant First Amendment burden.” Id.

The Court also rejected the idea that the buffer zones were constitutional because they left ample alternative channels for communication. Id. at 2536–37. In McCullen, the size of the buffer zone made it difficult to distinguish persons headed to the clinic from passersby “in time to initiate a conversation before they enter[ed] the buffer zone.” Id. at 2535. As a result, the plaintiffs were often forced to raise their voices from outside the buffer zone once they identified the clinic patients, thereby forcing a mode of communication contrary to their compassionate message and preventing them from distributing pamphlets. Id. at 2535-36. Where the plaintiffs wished to engage in quiet conversations with women seeking abortions and not in noisy protest speech, the Court held it was “no answer to say that petitioners can still be ‘seen and heard’ by women within the buffer zones.” Id. at 2537. Instead, the Supreme Court concluded the thirty-five foot buffer zones had “effectively stifled petitioners’ message” by prohibiting the plaintiffs’ chosen means of communication. Id.

Finally, the Court held the buffer zones burdened substantially more speech than necessary to achieve the state’s asserted interests in public safety, preventing harassment of women and clinic staff seeking entrance to clinics, and preventing deliberate obstruction of clinic entrances. Id. Although the Court acknowledged the importance of these interests, it determined the state’s chosen method of achieving them —categorically excluding most individuals from the buffer zones— was not narrowly tailored. Id. at 2537–41. That is, the Court held the government had not demonstrated “that alternative measures that burden substantially less speech would fail to achieve the government’s interests.” Id. at 2540. In so doing, the Court expressly rejected the argument that the government could choose a particular means of achieving its interests merely because that method was easier to administer. Id.

Here, the Order imposes substantially similar restrictions on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment activities as the buffer-zone statute did in McCullen. Specifically, the Order imposes a categorical ban on First Amendment activity within the Restricted Areas. This ban effectively destroys Plaintiffs’ ability to engage in one-on-one communication and leafletting within the Restricted Areas. And the record is silent on whether Plaintiff could adequately identify and thereby engage in their preferred method of communication before the public entered the Restricted Areas. Where the district court’s preliminary injunction analysis was based on a public forum analysis and the record does not contain facts to distinguish McCullen, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in finding that the Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim.

Moreover, the Judicial District’s asserted interests in banning First Amendment activity in the Restricted Areas are largely identical to the government interests asserted in McCullen: unhindered ingress and egress and public safety. See id. We agree these interests are legitimate. But on this record at least, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the means chosen to achieve those interests —a total ban on expressive activity— is not narrowly tailored, as even content-neutral regulations in a public forum must be. 9

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9 This is not to say that the Judicial District cannot impose content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions that are narrowly-tailored to advance the significant interests it identifies. Indeed, several of the provisions contained in the Order were not enjoined by the district court. As one example, paragraph 4 of the Order prohibits the use of sound amplification equipment. This type of content-neutral restriction has long been upheld. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1989).
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In summary, the district court did not abuse its discretion by analyzing the issues at the preliminary injunction stage as if the Restricted Areas were public fora, or by considering alternative means of achieving the governmental interests in determining whether the Order is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. Similarly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding Plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claim that the complete prohibition of Plaintiffs’ plans to distribute pamphlets to people in a public forum is unconstitutional. See United States v. Apel, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1144, 1154–55 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“When the Government permits the public onto part of its property, in either a traditional or designated public forum, its ‘ability to permissibly restrict expressive conduct is very limited.’” (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983)).

Nevertheless, because the question of the forum status of the Restricted Areas will remain central to the district court’s permanent injunction analysis on remand, we now address principles relevant to the resolution of this issue. See Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 618 F.3d 1127, 1142 n.15 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is proper to . . . decide questions of law raised in this appeal that are certain to arise again . . . in order to guide the district court on remand.”). In doing so, we express no opinion as to the merits of that question.

C. Issues on Remand

To determine whether a permanent injunction should be granted, the district court must reach a final decision on the First Amendment issues in this case. Because the relevant First Amendment test varies according to the nature of the forum involved and because the Judicial District will presumably contest Plaintiffs’ characterization of the Restricted Areas as public fora, the district court is required to first determine the forum status of the Restricted Areas. In resolving this question, the parties must present evidence, and the district court must enter factual findings supporting its conclusion, that each of the Restricted Areas constitutes a traditional public forum, a designated public forum, or a nonpublic forum. See, e.g., Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 90–92 (2d Cir. 2004) (separately considering the forum status of state courthouses, court lands/grounds, and parking lots); Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 303 F.3d 959, 966–68 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding plaintiffs were likely to succeed on First Amendment challenge to rule restricting expressive clothing in municipal complex, including courtrooms, because the rule “does not differentiate between courtrooms and other public areas”), abrogated on other grounds by Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008); United States v. Gilbert, 920 F.2d 878, 884 (11th Cir. 1991) (Gilbert I) (holding portions of courthouse grounds were designated public fora, while other parts of the grounds were nonpublic fora). We summarize the relevant precedent on these issues now in an attempt to aid the district court and the parties in this task on remand. In addition, we provide some limited guidance to the district court and the parties on the tension between the Judicial District and Denver over the appropriate use of the Restricted Areas.

1. Traditional Public Fora

The Supreme Court has long recognized “that public places historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without more, to be public forums.” United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (identifying as “quintessential” public fora those spaces that “time out of mind[] have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions”). Here, the Restricted Areas include the arced walkway that runs from the corner of Elati Street and Colfax Avenue in a curved path across the front of the Courthouse to the Patio in front of the main entrance to the Courthouse. The inclusion of this area raises at least a question concerning its status as traditional a public forum.

The Supreme Court has also cautioned, however, that not all streets and sidewalks are traditional public fora. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (discussing a postal sidewalk “constructed solely to provide for the passage of individuals engaged in postal business” from the parking area to the post office door); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 835–37 (1976) (speech restrictions on a military reservation that contained streets and sidewalks). Instead, the particular characteristics of a sidewalk are highly relevant to the inquiry. See Grace, 461 U.S. at 179–80. “The mere physical characteristics of the property cannot dictate” the outcome of the forum analysis. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727. Rather, “the location and purpose of a publicly owned sidewalk is critical to determining whether such a sidewalk constitutes a public forum.” Id. at 728–29.

The Supreme Court’s discussion in Grace is likely to be of particular relevance on remand. In Grace, the Court considered whether a federal statute prohibiting expressive activities on the Supreme Court’s grounds could be constitutionally applied to the adjacent public sidewalks. 461 U.S. at 172–73. The Court found the public sidewalks along the perimeter of the grounds were physically indistinguishable from other public sidewalks in Washington, D.C. Id. at 179. “There is no separation, no fence, and no indication whatever to persons stepping from the street to the curb and sidewalks that serve as the perimeter of the Court grounds that they have entered some special type of enclave.” Id. at 180. See also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992) (“[W]e have recognized that the location of property also has a bearing [on whether it is a traditional public forum] because separation from acknowledged public areas may serve to indicate that the separated property is a special enclave, subject to greater restriction.”). In the absence of some physical distinction between typical public sidewalks and the sidewalks making up the perimeter of the Court grounds, the Court in Grace held the perimeter sidewalks were traditional public fora, subject only to those restrictions normally allowed in such spaces. 461 U.S. at 180. Thus, on remand here, the district court must determine whether the evidence supports a finding that the arced walkway is physically distinguishable from other public sidewalks.

But the physical similarity to public sidewalks is not alone determinative of these sidewalks’ forum status. In Kokinda, the Supreme Court held that a sidewalk owned by and in front of a United States Post Office was not a traditional public forum, despite the fact that it was physically identical to a public sidewalk across the parking lot from the post office entrance. 497 U.S. at 727. The Court reasoned the post office sidewalk did not share the characteristics of a sidewalk open to the public at large. Although the public sidewalk formed a public passageway that served as a general thoroughfare, in contrast, “the postal sidewalk was constructed solely to provide for the passage of individuals engaged in postal business.” Id. As a result, the Court held the postal sidewalk was not a traditional public forum. Id. at 729–30. Accordingly, the evidence and findings of fact on remand should be focused on the physical characteristics and the intended and actual use of any sidewalks included in the Restricted Areas.

Importantly, the mere fact a sidewalk abuts a courthouse or its grounds is not determinative of the forum status of the sidewalk. 10 The Grace Court expressly rejected the idea that a traditional public forum could be transformed into a nonpublic forum merely because of its physical proximity to government property. 461 U.S. at 180. The Court stated

[t]raditional public forum property occupies a special position in terms of First Amendment protection and will not lose its historically recognized character for the reason that it abuts government property that has been dedicated to a use other than as a forum for public expression. Nor may the government transform the character of the property by the expedient of including it within the statutory definition of what might be considered a non-public forum parcel of property.

Id.; see also Rodney A. Smolla, 1 Smolla & Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 8:32 (“With the development of modern public forum doctrine, courts increasingly have come to recognize that they are not immune from the rules set down for other public property.”). In Grace, the Supreme Court concluded, “[w]e are convinced . . . that the [statute], which totally bans the specified communicative activity on the public sidewalks around the Court grounds, cannot be justified as a reasonable place restriction primarily because it has an insufficient nexus with any of the public interests [asserted].” 461 U.S. at 181. Similarly, the fact that the arced walkway abuts the Courthouse here is not determinative alone of its forum status.

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10 The cases relied on by the Judicial District do not support the blanket proposition that all courthouse grounds are automatically nonpublic fora merely because they physically abut a courthouse. Rather, these cases first conclude the grounds are not a traditional public forum and then carefully consider the physical characteristics of the government property, as well as the prior use of that property for expressive activities, to determine its forum status. See Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 90–92 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding courthouses were nonpublic fora where buildings housing the courts had not been traditionally open to the public for expressive activities and such activities inside the courthouse would likely be incompatible with the purposes the courthouse serves); Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 303 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding civil complex, including courts and public offices had not “by long tradition or by government fiat” been open to public expression and agreeing with parties that it was a nonpublic forum), abrogated on other grounds by Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). See also United States v. Gilbert (Gilbert I), 920 F.2d 878, 884–85 (11th Cir. 1991) (considering prior expressive activities on different areas of court grounds and holding some portions had been designated as public fora, while other parts of the grounds were nonpublic fora).
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The district court will also be required to decide the forum status of the Patio before it can apply the proper standard to restrictions on expressive activity in that Restricted Area. The D.C. Circuit recently applied the Court’s forum analysis in Grace to the question of whether the plaza in front of the Supreme Court was a traditional public forum. See Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2016) (No. 15-863). The court’s analysis focused on the plaza’s physical characteristics, emphasizing the architectural integration of the plaza with the Supreme Court building itself, as well as the physical separation between the plaza and the perimeter sidewalks. Id. at 1158–59. In particular, the D.C. Circuit relied on evidence that the Supreme Court plaza is elevated from the public sidewalk by a set of marble steps that contrast with the public sidewalk, but match the steps leading to the entrance of the Supreme Court building. It also relied on evidence that the plaza is surrounded by a low wall that matches the wall surrounding the Supreme Court building. Id. at 1158. According to the court, a visitor would be on notice that the pathway to the Supreme Court begins on the plaza. Id. Because the physical characteristics of the plaza indicated an intentional separation from the surrounding sidewalks and because the plaza had not traditionally been a space open for expressive activities, the D.C. Circuit held the Supreme Court plaza was a nonpublic forum. Id. at 1159–60.

Here, the parties should present evidence and the district court should make findings about the physical characteristics of the arced walkway and Patio, with attention to the ways in which each is distinguished from public sidewalks and the public areas of the Plaza. Specifically, the district court should consider whether it would be apparent to a visitor that by entering the Patio he is entering an enclave connected with the Courthouse and whether the use of the arced walkway is limited to courthouse ingress and egress.

?2. Designated Public Fora

If the district court finds that one or more of the Restricted Areas is not a traditional public forum, it must next consider whether the Restricted Area has been nevertheless designated as public fora. The Supreme Court has explained that “a government entity may create ‘a designated public forum’ if government property that has not traditionally been regarded as a public forum is intentionally opened up for that purpose.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (holding that placement of certain privately donated permanent monuments in public park while rejecting others constituted government, not public, speech). To create a designated public forum, “the government must make an affirmative choice to open up its property for use as a public forum.” United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003) (holding that library’s provision of internet access did not open a designated public forum, but was offered as a technological extension of its book collection). The Court has further cautioned that “[t]he government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). See also Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2249–50 (2015) (holding that Texas did not intentionally open its license plates to public discourse). Thus, the government’s intent is the focus of this inquiry. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; see also Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 279 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Governmental intent is said to be the ‘touchstone’ of forum analysis.”), as corrected and reported at 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 40571, *15 (March 25, 1998).

The Supreme Court has further instructed that it “will not find that a public forum has been created in the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent, nor will [it] infer that the government intended to create a public forum when the nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive activity.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803. If the “principal function of the property would be disrupted by expressive activity,” the Supreme Court is “particularly reluctant” to conclude the government designated it as a public forum. Id. at 804. Consequently, prohibitions on speech within a courthouse have been routinely upheld. 11 See, e.g., Hodge, 799 F.3d at 1158 (upholding statute banning expressive activities within Supreme Court building); Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 718 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The courtroom is a nonpublic forum.”); Huminski, 396 F.3d at 91 (collecting cases and holding that the interior of a courthouse is not a public forum); Sefick v. Gardner, 164 F.3d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 1998) (“The lobby of the courthouse is not a traditional public forum or a designated public forum, not a place open to the public for the presentation of views. No one can hold a political rally in the lobby of a federal courthouse.”); Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that courtroom is a nonpublic forum).

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11 The preliminary injunction here does not enjoin the Order’s restrictions on speech within the Courthouse.
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Under facts similar to those here, the Seventh Circuit held the plaintiffs had no First Amendment right to distribute jury nullification pamphlets in the lobby of the county courthouse. Braun v. Baldwin, 346 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[Plaintiffs] have no greater right than a criminal defendant’s lawyer to tell jurors in the courthouse to disobey the judge’s instructions.” (emphasis added)). See also United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1979) (upholding conviction for jury tampering where the defendant, who did not raise a First Amendment defense, attempted to have jury nullification literature delivered to a juror in a pending case).

Although there is little doubt the interior of a courthouse is a nonpublic forum, the forum status of a courthouse’s exterior is dependent upon the unique facts involved. Compare Grace, 461 U.S. at 182 (acknowledging “necessity to protect persons and property or to maintain proper order and decorum within the Supreme Court grounds,” but striking as unconstitutional a ban on expressive activities on abutting sidewalks), with Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562–64, 572–74 (1965) (upholding statute prohibiting demonstration outside a courthouse intended to affect the outcome of pending criminal charges, but reversing defendant’s conviction pursuant to the statute under the circumstances). In determining whether the government “intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a public forum,” the Supreme Court “has looked to the policy and practice of the government and to the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity.” Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Applying these principles, the Eleventh Circuit reached contrary conclusions regarding different portions of the grounds of a federal building housing a federal district court and federal agencies. Gilbert I, 902 F.2d at 884. In Gilbert I, the plaintiff challenged an injunction prohibiting him from using the federal building as his home and from engaging in certain expressive activities in and around the building. The ground level of the federal building included an interior lobby and, outside the lobby doors, a covered portico leading to an uncovered plaza. Id. at 880–81. Because demonstrations had occurred frequently on the uncovered plaza, the Eleventh Circuit held the uncovered plaza had been designated as a public forum. In contrast, it determined the covered portico area was not a public forum. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied in part on the district court’s finding that the Government Services Agency (GSA) had an unwritten policy of excluding demonstrators from the covered portico. Although there was evidence demonstrators had occasionally used the portico during protest activities, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the district court’s finding that these were “isolated instances of undiscovered violations” of the GSA policy and not the intentional “opening of a nontraditional forum for public discourse.” 12 Id. at 884–85.

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12 After the Eleventh Circuit issued this decision, an unrelated security issue caused the GSA to place a row of planters across the uncovered plaza and to issue a statement limiting the public forum to the area between the planters and the public street. Mr. Gilbert again sued and the circuit court upheld the district court’s ruling that the GSA had effectively withdrawn the area between the planters and the building previously designated as a public forum. See United States v. Gilbert (Gilbert III), 130 F.3d 1458, 1461 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The government is not required to retain indefinitely the open character of a facility.”). Between Gilbert I and Gilbert III, the Eleventh Circuit upheld Mr. Gilbert’s conviction for obstructing the entrance to the federal building. United States v. Gilbert (Gilbert II), 47 F.3d 1116, 1117 (11th Cir. 1995).
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As the decision in Gilbert I demonstrates, the issue of whether an area associated with a courthouse has been designated as a public or nonpublic forum is highly dependent on the evidence of the government’s intent to open the area to public speech. That intent can be established by the government’s policy statements, 13 affirmative actions by the government to designate the area as a public forum, 14 stipulation, 15 the compatibility of expressive activity with the principal function of the property, 16 and whether and the frequency with which public speech has been permitted in the forum. 17 To avoid post hoc justification for a desire to suppress a particular message, courts have considered the government’s statement of policy in light of the government’s actual practice. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Dep’t of Aviation of City of Chi., 45 F.3d 1144, 1153–54 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[A] court must examine the actual policy —as gleaned from the consistent practice with regard to various speakers— to determine whether a state intended to create a designated public forum.”); Hays Cty. Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 117–18 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he government’s policy is indicated by its consistent practice, not each exceptional regulation that departs from the consistent practice.”). Accordingly, forum status is an inherently factual inquiry about the government’s intent and the surrounding circumstances that requires the district court to make detailed factual findings. See Stewart v. D. C. Armory Bd., 863 F.2d 1013, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that “identifying the government’s intent . . . raises inherently factual issues that cannot be resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion”); Air Line Pilots, 45 F.3d at 1154 (same). And the ultimate question is whether the facts indicate the government intended to open a nontraditional forum to expressive activity. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (“The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.”).

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13 Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273, 1276-77 (10th Cir. 1996) (relying on senior citizen center policies to determine forum status of senior centers); Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1991) (relying on county charter and local law as indicia of county’s intent to dedicate coliseum to a broad array of public and expressive purposes); Gilbert I, 920 F.2d at 884 (relying on unwritten GSA policy banning demonstrations from the covered portico).

14 Church on the Rock, 84 F.3d at 1278 (holding that senior centers were designated as public fora because the city had “permitted lectures and classes on a broad range of subjects by both members and non-members”); Huminski, 396 F.3d at 91 (holding courthouse parking lot is not a public forum because there was no evidence the government did anything to designate it as such).

15 Grider v. Abramson, 180 F.3d 739, 748 n.11 (6th Cir. 1999) (relying on stipulation of the parties that courthouse steps are a public forum).

16 Paulsen, 925 F.3d at 70 (holding that coliseum grounds are a public forum, in part, because the property can accommodate a wide variety of expressive activity without threatening the government function of the facility); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 835– 37 (1976) (holding military reservation is not a public forum); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (same as to jailhouse).

17 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981) (holding university’s policy of accommodating student meetings created a forum generally open for student use); Paulsen, 925 F.3d at 70 (“The grounds of the Coliseum have been used for parades, political rallies and speeches, religious weddings and circuses. . . . Routinely, banners have been displayed by patrons . . . . Significantly, . . . many groups, including war veterans, the Christian Joy Fellowship and the Salvation Army, were regularly permitted to solicit contributions or distribute literature.”); Gilbert I, 920 F.2d at 884 (holding that unenclosed plaza of a federal building that houses courtrooms has been opened by the government as a public forum because “[d]emonstrations occur there on a frequent basis,” but holding covered portico was not opened as a public forum because occasional demonstrations there were undetected violations of GSA policy).
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3. Disagreement Over Opening the Restricted Areas as Public Fora

Here, the issue of the government’s intent is complicated by the disagreement between Denver and the Judicial District about the forum status of the Restricted Areas.

According to Denver, it intended to and did open all areas of the Plaza, including those within the Restricted Areas, to the public for expressive activity. In fact, Denver (one of the Defendants) entered into a Stipulation to this effect with Plaintiffs. Cf. Grider v. Abramson, 180 F.3d 739, 748 n.11 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that parties had stipulated that courthouse steps are a public forum). In contrast, the Judicial District argues Denver’s Stipulation that the entire Plaza is a public forum cannot control the status of the Restricted Areas because Colorado law vests the judicial branch with inherent authority to regulate state courthouses. As such, the Judicial District asserts that its intent —not Denver’s— should control the forum status of the Restricted Areas.

This argument between Defendants raises difficult and novel questions about the intersection between a government property owner’s power to designate its property as a public forum and the rights of the occupant of the government property —in this case another governmental entity— to use that property without interference. The parties have not directed us to any authority addressing the question of whose intent controls when two governmental entities disagree about the status of the same forum, and our own research has not revealed any decision precisely on point. But a review of the evolution of the Supreme Court’s doctrine on speech forums reveals some fundamental principles that may guide resolution of this difficult question.

The Supreme Court has not always recognized a First Amendment right of the public to use publicly owned property for expressive purposes. Indeed, the Court’s early jurisprudence recognized the absolute right of the government to exclude the public from using its property. See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 46–47 (1897); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 233, 236–37 (discussing the Supreme Court’s early forum jurisprudence). In Davis, the Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a Boston city ordinance forbidding “any public address” on public property “except in accordance with a permit from the mayor.” 167 U.S. at 44. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had affirmed a preacher’s conviction for violating the ordinance by preaching on Boston Common without first obtaining a permit from the mayor, stating “[f]or the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house.” Id. at 47 (quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895) (Holmes, J.)). The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, concluding that “[t]he right to absolutely exclude all right to use necessarily includes the authority to determine under what circumstances such use may be availed of, as the greater power contains the lesser.” Id. at 48. Under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence at the time, the government —as the owner of public property— retained an absolute right to exclude the public from that property, just as any private property owner would have the right to exclude others. See Stone, supra, at 237 (“[T]he state possessed the power absolutely to prohibit the exercise of First Amendment rights of speech on public property simply by asserting the prerogatives traditionally associated with the private ownership of land. The complex and difficult problem of the public forum had been ‘solved’ by resort to common law concepts of private property.”).

Later, the Supreme Court revisited the question of the public’s use of government property for expressive purposes and again relied on traditional notions of private property ownership. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). In Hague, the Court considered the constitutionality of city ordinances prohibiting all public meetings and leafletting in streets and other public places without a permit. Id. at 501–03. Departing from its analysis in Davis, Justice Roberts, writing for a plurality of the Court, stated:

Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.

Id. at 515–16. Justice Roberts’s position accepted the underlying premise of Davis —that the owner of government property enjoyed the same prerogatives as any private property owner— but then extended that premise to predicate a “public forum right upon established common law notions of adverse possession and public trust.” Stone, supra, at 238. See also Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 13 (describing Justice Roberts’s analysis in Hague as establishing “a kind of First-Amendment easement” in which the public, through long use and tradition, has acquired a right to use certain types of public property for First Amendment purposes).

Although Justice Roberts spoke only for a plurality of the Hague Court, his formulation has since been accepted by the Supreme Court as the prevailing rationale underlying the concept of traditional public fora. See, e.g., Perry Educ., 460 U.S. at 45 (defining traditional public fora by adopting Justice Roberts’s “time out of mind” description). Even in the context of a traditional public forum in which the government property owner’s power to exclude and curtail use is sharply circumscribed, the underlying rationale is premised on traditional notions of private property ownership. Indeed, the government’s power to control speech in a traditional public forum is circumscribed precisely because the public has, through the extent and nature of its use of these types of government property, acquired, in effect, a “speech easement” that the government property owner must now honor.

The Supreme Court has continued to rely on traditional notions of property ownership to describe the government’s ability to control the use of its property. For example, the Supreme Court has recognized that the government, “no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.” Greer, 424 U.S. at 836 (emphasis added). This includes the ability to designate portions of government property for expressive purposes. See Perry Educ., 460 U.S. at 45. But the underlying rationale of a designated public forum is that the governmental entity with control over the property can decide whether and to what extent to open nontraditional fora to public speech. See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010) (“[I]n a progression of cases, this Court has employed forum analysis to determine when a governmental entity, in regulating property in its charge, may place limitations on speech.”) (emphasis added)).

In this case, the record before the district court at the preliminary injunction hearing indicated that Denver is the owner of the Courthouse and its surrounding grounds. It was also undisputed that there is no lease agreement between Denver and the Judicial District that could have transferred some of Denver’s property interests to the Judicial District. And the Judicial District is not the only occupant of the building; the county also has courtrooms in the building. As a result, Denver’s intent will be particularly relevant to a determination of whether the Restricted Areas were designated as a public forum.

Nevertheless, the Judicial District argues Denver may not unilaterally designate the Restricted Areas as public fora because, under Colorado law, the state judicial branch is endowed with inherent authority as an independent and co-equal branch of government to regulate state courthouses. The first problem with this argument is that it ignores the limits of that inherent authority. Although Colorado permits its courts to do all that is “reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dignity, independence, and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective,” the Colorado Supreme Court has recognized that this inherent authority is not without its limitations. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Weld Cty. v. Nineteenth Judicial Dist., 895 P.2d 545, 547–48 (Colo. 1995) (quoting Pena v. District Ct., 681 P.2d 953, 956 (Colo.1984)). Specifically, the “court’s inherent authority terminates when its ability to carry out its constitutional duty to administer justice is no longer threatened.” Id. at 549.

On the existing record, the Judicial District has not demonstrated that Plaintiffs’ First Amendment activities interfered with the ability of the Judicial District to carry out its essential functions. Mr. Steadman testified that Plaintiffs’ pamphleteering presented no security risk to the Courthouse. And the Judicial District presented no evidence indicating that the narrow preliminary injunction issued by the district court would interfere with its judicial functions. On the record before us, therefore, the Judicial District has not demonstrated that the preliminary injunction issued by the district court implicates the court’s inherent authority.

But it is also true that Denver’s statement of its intent is only one factor to be considered by the district court in determining whether a permanent injunction should issue. Recall that the government’s statement of policy should be weighed against the evidence of its actual practice to avoid post hoc justifications. See Air Line Pilots, 45 F.3d at 1153; Hays Cty. Guardian, 969 F.2d at 117–18. Denver’s concession in the Stipulation and its expressions of past intent could be motivated by fiscal or other considerations that are inconsistent with its actual practice.

For example, although the evidence indicated that some expressive activity has occurred in the Restricted Areas, those occasions may have been “isolated incidents of undiscovered violations,” rather than evidence of affirmative acts to open the Restricted Areas as public fora. Gilbert I, 920 F.2d at 885. And a contrary intent might be gleaned from the design of the Restricted Areas and the extent to which public and private areas are clearly separated. See Grace, 461 U.S. at 179–80. Also of importance in assessing whether the Restricted Areas have been designated as public fora is the extent to which doing so is incompatible with the primary use of the Courthouse. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803. That is, it would be strong evidence that Denver did not intend to designate all of the Restricted Areas as public fora if to do so would destroy the primary function of the Courthouse. Or in different terms, the district court must assess whether it is credible that a governmental owner would construct a courthouse and install state and county judicial operations within it, only to designate public fora so intrusively that the essential function of the courthouse is thwarted. Thus, although the Stipulation provides some evidence on the question of whether the Restricted Areas have been designated as public fora, it is not alone determinative of that question.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the record before it, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. We therefore AFFIRM the order entering a limited preliminary injunction in favor of Plaintiffs, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Occupy v. Martinez (Plaza Protest Ban) 2015 Order Granting Prelim Injunction


While we await a judge’s response to the complaint and motion for a preliminary injunction against DIA’s free speech permit, I was drawn to reminisce about an earlier federal injunction GRANTED against Denver’s 2nd Judicial District. It was/is (!) also a preliminary injunction curbing police intimidation. This one prevents arrests of Jury Nullification pamphleteers at the Lindsey Flanigan Courthouse in Denver. More broadly, it halts the enforcement of the despotic “Chief Justice Order 1” which attempted to curb free speech in Tully Plaza, between the courthouse and the jail, site of innumerable protest rallies since the facility was erected in 2010. After a protracted legal battle, the case will finally come to trial in April 2017. This case also started with police overreach, then a complaint, a motion, and a hearing. In August 2015, US District Judge William Martinez issued the below court order granting the preliminary injunction.

Document 28 Filed 08/25/15 USDC Colorado

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez

Civil Action No. 15-cv-1775-WJM-MJW

ERIC VERLO,?
JANET MATZEN, and?
FULLY INFORMED JURY ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs, v.

THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO, a municipality,?ROBERT C. WHITE, in his official capacity as chief of police for Denver, and CHIEF JUDGE MICHAEL MARTINEZ, in his official capacity as chief judge of the Second Judicial District,

Defendants.

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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Plaintiffs Eric Verlo, Janet Matzen, and the Fully Informed Jury Association (“FIJA”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this lawsuit to establish that they have a First Amendment right to distribute and discuss literature regarding jury nullification in the plaza outside of Denver’s Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse (“Courthouse Plaza” or “Plaza”). (ECF Nos. 1, 13-1.) The Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse is where most criminal proceedings take place for Colorado’s Second Judicial District (which is coterminous with the City and County of Denver).

Plaintiffs have sued the City and County of Denver itself and its police chief, Robert C. White, in his official capacity (jointly, “Denver”). Plaintiffs have also sued the Hon. Michael A. Martinez 1 in his official capacity as Chief Judge of the Second Judicial District. Out of recognition that Plaintiffs’ lawsuit does not target Chief Judge Martinez himself but rather a policy promulgated by the Second Judicial District through Chief Judge Martinez, the Court will refer below to Chief Judge Martinez as “the Second Judicial District.”

On the same day Plaintiffs filed their complaint, they also moved for a preliminary injunction to restrain Defendants from taking any action to stop them from distributing certain literature regarding, or advocating for, jury nullification on the Courthouse Plaza (“Motion”). (ECF No. 2.) The Second Judicial District, represented by the Colorado Attorney General’s office, filed a response defending its current policy of limiting expressive activities to certain areas away from the main walkways leading to the Courthouse doors. (ECF No. 24.) Denver, represented by the Denver City Attorney’s office, did not file a response, but instead filed a joint stipulation with Plaintiffs regarding the status of the Plaza. (ECF No. 23.) As discussed further below, Denver (a) has no intent to enforce the Second Judicial District’s policy that would otherwise restrict Plaintiffs’ activities, and (b) agrees with Plaintiffs that they have a First Amendment right to distribute and discuss their literature essentially anywhere on the Courthouse Plaza, including in the areas designated as restricted by the Second Judicial District.

This Court held an evidentiary hearing and heard oral argument on August 21, 2015. Having considered all of the filings, evidence, and arguments submitted to date, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ Motion for the reasons explained below.

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1 No relation to the undersigned.?
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I. LEGAL STANDARD

To prevail on a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing that four equitable factors weigh in their favor: (1) they are substantially likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) their threatened injury outweighs the injury the opposing party will suffer under the injunction; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. See Westar Energy, Inc. v. Lake, 552 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2009); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Urban Gorilla, LLC, 500 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007). “[B]ecause a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal.” Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2003).

II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts Alleged in the Original Complaint

Plaintiffs’ original complaint recounts the story of two non-parties, Mark Iannicelli and Eric Brandt, who were passing out pamphlets on the Courthouse Plaza on July 27, 2015. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 14.) The pamphlets were titled “Fresh Air for Justice” and “Your Jury Rights: True or False?” (Id. ¶ 15; ECF No. 1-3; ECF No. 1-4.) Both pamphlets contain some history of jury nullification and various general statements about the jury’s role as envisioned by the Framers. (See generally ECF Nos. 1-3, 1-4.) But the pamphlets also contain certain calls to action which could raise concern. “Fresh Air for Justice,” for example, contains the following:

• “Judges say the law is for them to decide. That’s not true. When you are a juror, you have the right to decide both law and fact.” (ECF No. 1-3?at 3.) ?

• “If the law violates any human rights, you must vote no against that law by voting ‘not guilty.’” (Id. (emphasis in original).) ?

“Fresh Air for Justice” also contains the following, which could be interpreted as encouraging prospective jurors to lie during voir dire:

When you are called for jury duty, you will be one of the few people in the courtroom who wants justice rather than to win or to score career points. For you to defend against corrupt politicians and their corrupt laws, you must get on the jury. During the jury selection, prosecutors and judges often work together to remove honest, thinking people from juries. ?

When you’re questioned during jury selection, just say you don’t keep track of political issues. Show an impartial attitude. Don’t let the judge and prosecutor stack the jury by removing all the thinking, honest people!

Instructions and oaths are designed to bully jurors and protect political power. Although it all sounds very official, instructions and oaths are not legally binding, or there would be no need for independent thinking jurors like you.?

?(Id. at 4.)

The other pamphlet, “Your Jury Rights: True or False?”, does not contain language quite as direct as the foregoing, but it does declare, “You cannot be forced to obey a ‘juror’s oath.’” (ECF No. 1-4 at 3.) ?

Iannicelli was arrested on the Plaza that day, and Brandt was arrested on a warrant a few days later. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 18.) Both were charged with jury tampering: “A person commits jury-tampering if, with intent to influence a juror’s vote, opinion, decision, or other action in a case, he attempts directly or indirectly to communicate with a juror other than as a part of the proceedings in the trial of the case.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-609(1). The affidavit supporting Brandt’s arrest mentions that he and Iannicelli had been on the Courthouse Plaza at a time that jurors “would be expected to be arriving” for the ongoing death penalty prosecution of Dexter Lewis. (ECF No. 1-2 at 4.) 2

Plaintiff Eric Verlo “wishes to pass out the same literature on the Lindsey-Flannigan [sic; ‘Flanigan’] plaza as Eric Brandt and Mark Iannicelli were passing out which caused them to be arrested.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 9.) Plaintiff Janet Matzen wishes to do the same. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff FIJA is

an association, based in Montana, who’s [sic] members passionately believe in the concept of jury nullification. FIJA intends to hold an educational campaign in Denver on September 5, 2015 where its members wish to pass out the same brochures on the Lindsey-Flannigan [sic] plaza as Eric Brandt and Mark Iannicelli . . . .

(Id. ¶ 11.) 3 Plaintiffs say that the arrests of Brandt and Iannicelli have caused them to to fear that they too might be arrested and prosecuted. (Id. ¶ 22.)

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2 Lewis was charged with murdering five individuals at a Denver bar in 2012. See, e.g., Jordan Steffen & Matthew Nussbaum, “Denver jury hears opening arguments in five Fero’s bar killings,” Denver Post (July 20, 2015), at http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_28513519/denver-jury-hears-opening-arguments-five-feros-bar (last accessed Aug. 24, 2015).

3 September 5, 2015, is a Saturday —an unlikely day for a jury nullification advocate to reach his or her target audience at a courthouse. When this was pointed out at the preliminary injunction hearing, counsel for Plaintiffs qualified the date with an “on or about.”
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?B. Facts Alleged in the Amended Complaint & Supplemental Filings

Two days after filing suit, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to insert allegations regarding a Second Judicial District administrative order recently posted on the Courthouse doors. (ECF No. 13-1 ¶ 2.) The order, designated “CJO 15-1” and dated August 14, 2015, was titled “Chief Judge Order Regarding Expressive Activities at the Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse.” (ECF No. 24-1.) This order was actually amended on August 21, 2015, hours before the preliminary injunction hearing in this Court, and admitted as Exhibit 1 in that hearing. (See ECF No. 25-1.) The Court will refer to the amended order as the “Plaza Order.” In relevant part, it reads as follows:

The Court has the responsibility and authority to ensure the safe and orderly use of the facilities of the Second Judicial District; to minimize activities which unreasonably disrupt, interrupt, or interfere with the orderly and peaceful conduct of court business in a neutral forum free of actual or perceived partiality, bias, prejudice, or favoritism; to provide for the fair and orderly conduct of hearings and trials; to promote the free flow of pedestrian and vehicular traffic on sidewalks and streets; and to maintain proper judicial decorum. Those having business with the courts must be able to enter and exit the Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse freely, in a safe and orderly fashion and unhindered by threats, confrontation, interference, or harassment. Accordingly, the Court hereby prohibits certain expressive activities on the grounds of the Courthouse, as depicted in the highlighted areas of the attached map [reproduced below], without regard to the content of any particular message, idea, or form of speech.

Prohibited Activities: The activities listed below shall be prohibited in the following areas: anywhere inside the Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse, including courtrooms, corridors, hallways, and lobbies; the areas, lawns, walkways, or roadways between the Courthouse and public sidewalks and roads; and any areas, walkways, or roadways that connect public sidewalks and roads to Courthouse entrances or exits. This includes the Courthouse entrance plaza areas on the east and west sides of the Courthouse as depicted in the highlighted areas of the attached map.

1. Demonstrating; picketing; protesting; marching; parading; holding vigils or religious services; proselytizing or preaching; distributing literature or other materials, or engaging in similar conduct that involves the communication or expression of views or grievances; soliciting sales or donations; or engaging in any commercial activity; unless specifically authorized in writing by administration;

2. Obstructing the clear passage, entry, or exit of law enforcement and emergency vehicles and personnel, Courthouse personnel, and other persons having business with the courts through Courthouse parking areas, entrances, and roadways to and from Courthouse and Courthouse grounds; ?

3. Erecting structures or other facilities, whether for a single proceeding or intended to remain in place until the conclusion of a matter; or placing tents, chairs, tables, or similar items on Courthouse grounds; except as specifically authorized in writing by administration; and ?

4. Using sound amplification equipment in a manner that harasses or interferes with persons entering or leaving Courthouse grounds or persons waiting in line to enter the Courthouse. ?

(Id. at 1–2 (formatting in original).) The Court will refer to the Plaza Order’s numbered paragraphs by their number, e.g., “Paragraph 1 of the Plaza Order” (referring to the forms of prohibited expressive activity). In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Plaza Order was “apparently” entered in response to Brandt’s and Iannicelli’s actions. (ECF No. 13-1 ¶ 2.)

The “attached map” referenced in the Plaza Order is reproduced on the following page:

(Id. at 3.) This map shows an aerial view of the Courthouse. The top of the map is north. The Courthouse itself is the irregularly shaped, white-roofed building occupying the left half of the map. Immediately to the left (west) of the Courthouse is Fox Street. Immediately to the north is Colfax Avenue. Immediately to the right (east) of the Courthouse grounds is Elati Street, which is closed to traffic other than police vehicles as it runs past the Courthouse. Elati bisects a circular area paved in a tan color. Just to the right (east) of Elati, and not depicted in the map, is Denver’s Van Cise-Simonet Detention Center (“Detention Center”), which houses pretrial detainees. Thus, the area between the Courthouse and Detention Center is a fairly spacious place suitable for public gatherings.

Immediately to the east and west of the Courthouse are areas that the Second Judicial District highlighted in yellow to indicate where expressive activity is restricted (“Restricted Area”). This matter principally concerns the arc-shaped portion of the Restricted Area to the east of the Courthouse (“East Restricted Area”). The East Restricted Area comprises the following:

• planter boxes and public art (collectively, “Landscaping”); ?

• sidewalks, including a narrow sidewalk beginning at the north of the map ?(just below the blue bus stop icon) and following the arc of the planter boxes until it reaches a much wider sidewalk that completes the arc, which itself connects with the awning-covered steps leading to the Courthouse front doors depicted in approximately the center of the map (collectively, “Sidewalks”); and ?

• a gravel passive security feature between the narrow sidewalk and the Courthouse itself (“Gravel Area”). ?

C. Evidence Received at the Preliminary Injunction Hearing

1. Commander Lopez

?Plaintiffs called as a witness Commander Antonio Lopez of the Denver Police Department. Lopez oversees the Denver Police district that encompasses the Courthouse and the Detention Center. Lopez testified that the Courthouse opened in 2010 or 2011. During that time, he has seen “more protests [in the area between the Courthouse and the Detention Center] than [he can] recall. At one point w e were averaging about two or three a week, in that area.” On cross-examination, Lopez clarified that most of those protests were nearer to the Detention Center than the Courthouse. Nonetheless, to Lopez’s knowledge, the Denver Police Department has never restricted or interfered with any peaceful First Amendment activity taking place between the Courthouse and the Detention Center.

2. Mr. Steadman

The Second Judicial District called Steven Steadman, who is the Colorado judicial branch’s security administrator. Steadman was closely involved in the discussions leading up to the Plaza Order. Steadman testified that, during those discussions, he was unaware of Brandt and Iannicelli or the distribution of jury nullification literature, and that the Plaza Order actually arose from very different concerns.

According to Steadman, discussions began with Chief Judge Martinez in early July 2015 because the Dexter Lewis trial was scheduled to overlap with another death penalty trial in Arapahoe County, i.e., the trial of Aurora theater shooter James Holmes. Steadman and Chief Judge Martinez specifically worried about potentially violent protests that might break out if Lewis (who is black) eventually received the death penalty but Holmes (who is white) did not. Proactively seeking to avoid such a problem, Steadman gave Chief Judge Martinez a copy of an order entered by the Hon. Carlos A. Samour, Jr., who presided over the Holmes trial in Arapahoe County. Judge Samour’s order apparently was a model for what the Second Judicial District eventually issued as the Plaza Order.

On cross-examination, Steadman confirmed that the Plaza Order was intended specifically to address the protests that might erupt if Holmes and Lewis were treated differently with respect to the death penalty. Steadman admitted, however, that his office could require several hours’ notice between the announcement that the jury had reached a verdict and the actual reading of the verdict, which would permit a police presence to assemble in anticipation of protests. Steadman also admitted that nothing like the Plaza Order had been in place or enforced prior to August 14, 2015, and that passing out jury nullification literature did not present any security risk beyond what the Second Judicial District has tolerated, without incident, since the Courthouse opened.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Article III Standing

As mentioned previously, Denver has stipulated with Plaintiffs that it will not enforce any prohibition on distributing jury nullification literature on the Courthouse Plaza. Specifically, Denver has stipulated that

Plaintiffs who wish to engage in peacefully passing out jury nullification literature to passersby on the Plaza are entitled to do so and that Denver, through its police or sheriff department, will not arrest or otherwise charge Plaintiffs for handing out literature regarding jury nullification so long as Plaintiffs do not violate Colorado law or Denver’s Revised Municipal Code when they are handing out their literature. The parties stipulate that Plaintiffs’ proposed intent of peacefully handing out jury nullification literature to or discussing jury nullification with passersby at the Plaza, without more, does not violate Colorado law. . .

***

. . . Denver stipulates that it does not intend to enforce the [Plaza] Order as written and will only impose content and viewpoint neutral reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on the use of the Plaza, and/or other exterior areas surrounding the Plaza if Denver determines that a compelling need exists to do so.

(ECF No. 23 ¶¶ 2, 4.)

?Given this stipulation, the Second Judicial District argues that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to bring this lawsuit because no threat of enforcement is imminent. (ECF No. 24 at 6–8.) See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” includes, among other things, an “actual or imminent” “invasion of a legally protected interest”); Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1176 (10th Cir. 2009) (to obtain prospective relief, a plaintiff must show a “credible threat of future prosecution”). As stated at the preliminary injunction hearing, however, the Court rejects this contention.

The Second Judicial District’s standing argument assumes that the only way an individual could run afoul of the Plaza Order is through Denver’s independent enforcement efforts. But Chief Judge Martinez, and perhaps any other judge in the Second Judicial District, could issue a contempt citation for violating the Plaza Order. Cf. Schmidter v. State, 103 So. 3d 263, 265–69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (distributor of FIJA literature convicted of contempt for violating an administrative order similar to the Plaza Order). The violator would then be required to appear before the issuing judge, and if he or she fails to appear, an arrest warrant can issue. See Colo. R. Civ. P. 107(c). Denver may then be obligated to arrest the violator —not on the authority of the Plaza Order, but on the authority of the judge’s contempt citation. See id. (requiring the sheriff to carry out the arrest). The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Colorado state law enforcement officers, not subject to Denver’s stipulation, could also effect the arrest of such a hypothetical violator.

Thus, the Court finds that Article III standing still exists, and the Court will move on to the elements Plaintiffs must establish to secure a preliminary injunction. To repeat, those elements are: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the injury the opposing party will suffer under the injunction; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Westar Energy, 552 F.3d at 1224.

?B. Likelihood of Success

Evaluating the likelihood of success requires evaluating the substantive merit of Plaintiffs’ claim that the First Amendment grants them a right to discuss and distribute pamphlets about jury nullification with individuals entering and leaving the Courthouse. To answer this question, the Supreme Court prescribes the following analysis:

1. Is the expression at issue protected by the First Amendment? ?

2. If so, is the location at issue a traditional public forum, a designated public ?forum, or a nonpublic forum? ?

3. If the location is a traditional or designated public forum, is the ?government’s speech restriction narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest? ?

?4. If the location is a nonpublic forum, is the government’s speech restriction reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum, and viewpoint neutral?

See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797–806 (1985). The Court will address these inquiries in turn.

1. Does the First Amendment Protect Plaintiffs’ Pamphlets and Oral Advocacy of the Message Contained in the Pamphlets?

The Court “must first decide whether [the speech at issue] is speech protected by the First Amendment, for, if it is not, we need go no further.” Id. at 797. There appears to be no contest on this point. The Second Judicial District has raised no argument that any part of the message conveyed by the pamphlets is unprotected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the Court deems it conceded for preliminary injunction purposes that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the question of whether the First Amendment protects their message.

2. Is the Courthouse Plaza a Public Forum?

The Court must next decide whether the Courthouse Plaza—and the Restricted Area specifically—is a public or nonpublic forum:

. . . the extent to which the Government can control access [to government property for expressive purposes] depends on the nature of the relevant forum. Because a principal purpose of traditional public fora is the free exchange of ideas, speakers can be excluded from a public forum only when the exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. Similarly, when the Government has intentionally designated a place or means of communication as a public forum speakers cannot be excluded without a compelling governmental interest. Access to a nonpublic forum, however, can be restricted as long as the restrictions are reasonable and are not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.

Id. at 800 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; alterations incorporated).

?The public/nonpublic inquiry presents a unique dilemma in this case. On the one hand, Denver’s stipulation with Plaintiffs includes the following: “The Lindsey-Flanigan plaza . . . which is located between the Van Cise-Simonet Detention Center and the Lindsey-Flanigan courthouse is a public forum and any content-based regulations must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest . . . .” (ECF No. 23 ¶ 1 (emphasis added).) On the other hand, the Second Judicial District strong ly disagrees:

. . . Plaintiffs assert that the courthouse plaza is a traditional public forum, and therefore maintain that Chief Judge Martinez’s administrative order must be strictly scrutinized. As a matter of state law, however, Chief Judge Martinez— and not Denver—is responsible for the oversight of the courthouse and the adjoining grounds. Thus, any concession on this point by Denver binds neither the parties nor this Court.

(ECF No. 24 at 8.) Apparently a minor turf war has erupted between Denver and the Second Judicial District over control of the Courthouse grounds.

When asked at the preliminary injunction hearing regarding the “state law” that gives Chief Judge Martinez “responsib[ility] for the oversight of the courthouse and the adjoining grounds,” counsel for the Second Judicial District directed the Court to Colorado Revised Statutes § 13-3-108(1). That subsection reads: “The board of county commissioners in each county shall continue to have the responsibility of providing and maintaining adequate courtrooms and other court facilities including janitorial service, except as otherwise provided in this section.” Neither this language, nor anything else in § 13-3-108, appears to relate to a chief judge’s authority over courthouse policies or courthouse grounds.

?Counsel for the Second Judicial District also pointed this Court to State ex rel. Norton v. Board of County Commissioners of Mesa County, 897 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1995) (“Mesa County”). In Mesa County, the county commissioners defied an order from the Twenty-First Judicial District’s chief judge requiring additional security measures at the county courthouse. See Mesa County, 897 P.2d at 789. The county commissioners further announced their intent to stop providing support of any kind to the Twenty-First Judicial District, arguably in violation of § 13-3-108(1) (quoted above), Colorado Revised Statutes § 13-1-114(2) (requiring county sheriffs to assist the judiciary when the judiciary perceives a “risk of violence in the court”), and Colorado Revised Statutes § 30-11-104(1) (requiring each county to “provide a suitable courthouse”). See id. The county commissioners believed that Colorado’s constitutional Taxpayers’ Bill of Rights allowed the county to disregard the foregoing statutes because they created an impermissible “subsidy” to the court system. Id. at 789–90. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the county commissioners’ position and held that counties’ statutory duties toward the court system are not “subsidies” under the Taxpayers’ Bill of Rights. Id. at 791.

The Mesa County decision highlights the relationship between counties and the state courts that sit within them. It emphasizes county sheriffs’ duties to assist judges in preventing “violence in the court.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-114(2). It does not support the Second Judicial District’s notion that it controls and can speak for the status of the Courthouse grounds.

Finally, counsel for the Second Judicial District cited this Court to In re Court Facilities for Routt County, 107 P.3d 981 (Colo. App. 2004) (“Routt County”). Routt County held that, under certain circumstances, a state judicial district’s chief judge has inherent authority to order the board of county commissioners to design and pay for a new courthouse. Id. at 984. Quoting Peña v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953, 956 (Colo. 1984), Routt County relied on the notion that “courts necessarily possess certain inherent powers, which . . . consist of ‘all powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dignity, independence, and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective.’” Routt County, 107 P.3d at 984.

Both Routt County and Peña specifically address the Colorado judiciary’s inherent authority to order another state or municipal entity to spend money on the judiciary’s behalf. That power is not at issue here. Nonetheless, the inherent authority described in Routt County and Peña could conceivably also extend to entering orders such as the Plaza Order. The ultimate question, however, is whether Denver or the Second Judicial District speaks for the First Amendment status of the Courthouse Plaza. For at least three reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are likely to prevail against the Second Judicial District on that question.

First, counsel for the Second Judicial District agrees that Denver owns the Courthouse itself and all of its grounds.

Second, counsel for the Second Judicial District further stated that there was no lease agreement of which he was aware between Denver and the Second Judicial District. Rather, the Second Judicial District occupies the Courthouse “as provided by law.”

?Third, it is undisputed that the Second Judicial District is not the Courthouse’s sole occupant. Denver County Court also sits in the Courthouse. Denver County Court is unique among county courts in Colorado because the Colorado Constitution grants Denver the authority to set the “number, manner of selection, qualifications, term of office, tenure, and removal of [its] judges.” Colo. Const. art. VI, § 26. Moreover, a Chief Justice Directive from the chief justice of the Colorado Supreme Court states that “[t]he chief judge of the Second Judicial District shall not have administrative authority over the Denver County Court.” CJD 95-01, Preamble (amended Aug. 17, 2012), available at https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Supreme_Court/Directives/95-01amended8-17-12.pdf. Thus, there are two distinct judicial bodies operating in the Courthouse, and the Second Judicial District apparently cannot speak for both.

For all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to prevail in their contention that Denver controls and speaks for the Courthouse Plaza. 4 Because Denver has stipulated that the Courthouse Plaza is a public forum, Plaintiffs are likewise likely to prevail in their claim that the Courthouse Plaza is at least a designated public forum, if not a traditional public forum. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. 5

Moreover, the Court notes that the Second Judicial District has not specif ically argued for a finding that the Courthouse Plaza is a nonpublic forum. Rather, it says that “resolving [the type of forum at issue] is not necessary for the purposes of this proceeding because [the Plaza Order] would satisfy even the strictest test.” (ECF No. 24 at 9.) Thus, the Court turns to the question of whether the Plaza Order can survive a strict scrutiny analysis. 6

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4 Ultimately, a Colorado state court may need to resolve this question. See, e.g., CJD 95-01 ¶ 15 (“Any disputes arising from the exercise of the authority described in this directive shall be resolved by the Chief Justice.”). In this posture, however, the Court need only conclude that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed.

5 If the Courthouse Plaza is indeed a public forum, it would be unique in that respect. The parties have not cited, nor could the Court find, a single case in which courthouse grounds were deemed a public forum. Cf. Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2005) (courthouse grounds not a public forum); Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2002) (same), abrogated on other grounds by Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008); Comfort v. MacLaughlin, 473 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (same); Schmidter, 103 So. 3d at 270 (same).

6 The ensuing analysis assumes, of course, that the Second Judicial District may attempt to enforce the Plaza Order through its own contempt power. If such power did not exist, there would likely be no reason to scrutinize the Plaza Order under any constitutional standard given Denver’s control over the Plaza and its stipulation not to interfere with Plaintiffs’ intended activities. (See Part III.A, supra.)
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3. Is the Plaza Order Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government Interest, and Does it Leave Open Ample Alternative Means of Communication?

“In [a] quintessential public forum[], the government may not prohibit all communicative activity.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see also id. at 46 (holding that the government may un-designate a designated public forum, but until it does so, “it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum”). The state may, however, “enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which [1] are content-neutral, [2] are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and [3] leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” Id. The Court will address each element in turn as it applies to the Plaza Order.

a. “Content-Neutral”?

The Plaza Order applies “without regard to the content of any particular message, idea, or form of speech.” (ECF No. 25-1 at 1.) On its face, then, it appears content-neutral. Plaintiffs have not argued otherwise.

b. “Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government Interest”

The Plaza Order itself asserts several interests:

. . . to minimize activities which unreasonably disrupt, interrupt, or interfere with the orderly and peaceful conduct of court business in a neutral forum free of actual or perceived partiality, bias, prejudice, or favoritism; to provide for the fair and orderly conduct of hearings and trials; to promote the free flow of pedestrian and vehicular traffic on sidewalks and streets; and to maintain proper judicial decorum . . . .

(Id.) However, in response to Plaintiffs’ Motion, the Second Judicial District has only defended the Plaza Order on the bases of preserving “the efficient functioning of the court” (e.g., unhindered ingress and egress to the Courthouse) and “maintain[ing] public safety.” (ECF No. 24 at 12.)

These are potentially “significant” government interests. Legitimate time-place- manner restrictions in a public forum can be motivated by “objectives [such as] public safety, accommodating competing uses of the easement, controlling the level and times of noise, and similar interests.” First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1132 (10th Cir. 2002). But the Court finds on this record that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in proving that the Plaza Order is not narrowly tailored to these stated objectives. Paragraph 1 of the Plaza Order bans essentially all expressive activity regardless of whether it would affect “the efficient functioning of the court” or threaten “public safety.” Courts look dimly on such “First Amendment Free Zones.” See Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987); First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1132.

Moreover, in the Second Judicial District’s briefing (see ECF No. 24 at 12) and at the preliminary injunction hearing, it became clear that the sole motivating concern behind the Plaza Order was potentially violent protests that could follow if Dexter Lewis receives the death penalty. Steadman, the Second Judicial District’s witness, agreed that other measures could address that concern, e.g., he could arrange for additional security well in advance of any verdict announcement. He also agreed that Plaintiffs’ activities posed no greater threat to the Courthouse than it has faced in the last five years, when expressive activities have been unrestricted. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs will likely demonstrate that at least Paragraph 1 of the Plaza Order is not narrowly tailored to serve the interests of maintaining public safety and the efficient functioning of the court.

c. “Leave Open Ample Alternative Channels of Communication”

Given the foregoing finding, inquiry into the alternative channels of communication is unnecessary. 7 The Court accordingly holds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in defeating at least Paragraph 1 of the Plaza Order under the strict scrutiny test applied to public forums.

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7 The Court nonetheless notes Plaintiffs’ argument at the preliminary injunction hearing that their advocacy requires person-to-person contact because the concept of jury nullification is obscure and does not lend itself well to pithy slogans that can easily be chanted or placed on a placard (and therefore understood from a distance). Plaintiffs’ counsel could not cite this Court to any authority holding that those wishing to advocate complicated or lesser understood concepts receive more solicitude than others when it comes to available channels of communication. To the contrary, the case law suggests that the government can more easily restrict person-to-person interaction because of its potential for harassment. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773–74 (1994). The Court need not resolve the issue at this time, but only raises it as a matter of potential concern as this case progresses.
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?C. Irreparable Injury

“[T]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1190 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the Second Judicial District offers no response to Plaintiffs’ irreparable injury argument. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs will be irreparably injured absent a preliminary injunction.
?
D. Balancing of Interests

The injury to a plaintiff deprived of his or her First Amendment rights almost always outweighs potential harm to the government if the injunction is granted. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1131 (10th Cir. 2012); ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999). And again, the Second Judicial District offers no response to Plaintiffs’ argument that the balance of interests tips in their favor. Accordingly, the Court finds that the balance indeed tips in Plaintiffs’ favor, although the Court will issue the narrowest injunction possible so that the Second Judicial District is not unduly restrained in its ability to maintain safety and proper judicial functioning. (See Part III.F, infra.)?

E. Public Interest

Finally, as with irreparable injury and balancing of interests, it is almost always in the public interest to prevent a First Amendment violation. See Awad, 670 F.3d at 1132; Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1163. The Second Judicial District does not argue otherwise. The Court therefore finds that a narrowly drawn injunction would be in the public interest.

?F. Scope of Injunctive Relief

The Court will enter a preliminary injunction in favor of Plaintiffs. However, the Court will not grant an injunction as broad as Plaintiffs’ counsel requested at the preliminary injunction hearing. Plaintiffs’ counsel requested an injunction stating that their message and form of advocacy is protected speech, supposedly to protect against any other government agency that might try to silence them. But the Court cannot say (on this record at least) that Plaintiffs’ message and form of advocacy is always protected speech under all circumstances. In addition, an injunction must run against a party—this Court cannot enter an injunction against the world at large. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2) (describing persons bound by an injunction). If Plaintiffs believe that a particular government agency is likely to attempt to silence them, they need to join that agency as a party and satisfy the preliminary injunction as against that agency. 8

Further, although Plaintiffs apparently seek to strike down the entire Plaza Order as unconstitutional, the Court will limit its injunction only to certain portions of the Plaza Order. As counsel for the Second Judicial District pointed out at the preliminary injunction hearing, the Plaza Order applies both inside and outside the Courthouse, but Plaintiffs have only challenged its restrictions outside the Courthouse. Accordingly, the Court will not disturb the Plaza Order as it operates inside the Courthouse.

In addition, the Court notes the Landscaping and Gravel Area in the East Restricted Area. Although no party discussed the scope of a potential injunction in these specific areas, the Court assumes for present purposes that Denver did not intend its public forum stipulation to authorize Plaintiffs to tramp through the Landscaping or the Gravel Area, both of which are ultimately designed for the Courthouse’s security. The Court therefore will not enjoin the operation of the Plaza Order as it applies to the Landscaping and Gravel Area.

The Court also notes that Plaintiffs have specifically alleged their intent to distribute and discuss the two pamphlets attached to their original complaint, “Fresh Air for Justice” (ECF No. 1-3) and “Your Jury Rights: True or False?” (ECF No. 1-4). At the preliminary injunction hearing, counsel for Plaintiffs reemphasized that these two pamphlets form the basis of what they wish to discuss. The Court will therefore limit its injunction to distribution of those specific pamphlets and oral advocacy of the message contained in those pamphlets.

Finally, only Paragraph 1 of the Plaza Order is truly at issue here. Plaintiffs have not challenged the Second Judicial District’s authority to prevent obstruction of the entryways (Paragraph 2), to prohibit the erection of structures (Paragraph 3), or to restrict sound amplification equipment (Paragraph 4). Thus, the Court will limit the injunction to Paragraph 1 of the Plaza Order. 9

————
8 Plaintiffs’ counsel expressed some concern that the Denver District Attorney’s office had been involved in the arrest of Brandt and Iannicelli and that the DA’s office might continue to pursue similar prosecutions. But Plaintiffs have not joined the DA’s office as a party, and in any event, in light of Denver’s stipulation with Plaintiffs, it is questionable whether the Denver Police Department would execute any arrest warrant based on Plaintiffs’ activities.

9 A party awarded a preliminary injunction normally must “give[] security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). The Tenth Circuit has held that “a trial court may, in the exercise of discretion, determine a bond is unnecessary to secure a preliminary injunction if there is an absence of proof showing a likelihood of harm.” Coquina Oil Corp. v. Transwestern Pipeline Co., 825 F.2d 1461, 1462 (10th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Second Judicial District has not put forth any evidence of a likelihood of harm, nor has it argued that Plaintiffs should be required to post a bond. Having considered the issue sua sponte, the Court determines that a bond is unnecessary in light of the lack of likely harm to the Second Judicial District, and in light of the nature of the case. Cf. 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2954 n.29 (3d ed., Apr. 2015 update) (citing public rights cases where the bond was excused or significantly reduced).
————

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ and Denver’s Stipulation (ECF No. 23) is ACCEPTED and shall be treated as if an order from this Court; ?

2. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED; and ?

3. The City and County of Denver, its police chief, Robert C. White, in his official capacity, and the Second Judicial District (including their respective officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and other persons who are in active concert or participation with any of them) (collectively, “Defendants”) are PRELIMINARILY ENJOINED as follows (all capitalized terms bear the respective meanings assigned above): ?

a. Save for any Plaintiff physically located on the Landscaping or Gravel Area, Defendants shall not enforce Paragraph 1 of the Plaza Order against any Plaintiff (including any FIJA member) physically located in the Restricted Area to the extent he or she is otherwise lawfully seeking to distribute and/or orally advocate the message contained in the pamphlets titled “Fresh Air for Justice” and/or “Your Jury Rights: True or False?”

b. To the extent consistent with the foregoing prohibition, Defendants remain free to enforce Paragraphs 2–4 of the Plaza Order.

Dated this 25th day of August, 2015.

BY THE COURT:

William J. Martínez?
United States District Judge

Cleveland cops only cared that Tunick’s 100 naked women were not marching.


The Spencer Tunick naked women photo-op at the Cleveland RNC provided an interesting spectacle. One hundred nude women aimed large mirrors at the convention center to shine light on the retrograde sexism of the GOP. They also might have stroked Donald Trump’s ego with a news headline he’s sure to have appreciated: A HUNDRED NAKED WOMEN GREET TRUMP AT THE RNC. Leave it to the press to mistake petitioners for groupies. What happened next also illuminated exactly what’s wrong with orchestrated protest. Nothing. Nothing wrong.

Tunick sweated about getting arrested for his per-usual photo project “Everything She Says Means Everything.” He’d gotten permission from the property owners, and his mass nudity installations are not misunderstood to be gatherings of sex offenders, but the RNC cops did show up. Their visit shed light on the very element Tunick was missing.

Esquire Magazine described the brief artist v. officer cultural exchange:

As soon as the women get into place, a van pulls up with four cops. The driver says to one of Tunick’s assistants: “What’s going on here? I just wanted to make sure there was no marching. There’s not going to be any marching in my area.” Then, they shake hands, and he drives off.

There’s not going to be any marching in my area says a cop untrusted to shut down unpermitted protest. Because dissent was envisioned to get out of hand, the city of Cleveland decided to abridge it. My area, the cop bragged. What a shame no one had the clothes to challenge him.

Naked masses of people express what again? The philosophy escapes me. Naked supplicants remind me of how the ancient Greeks forbade their slaves to wear clothes lest they conceal themselves as citizens. Apropos to today’s nudes, Greek and Roman slaves were also shorn. Military detainees in modern times are still stripped to prevent their escape. By definition, naked people wield nothing. To uphold inequity, indeed to maximize inequity, leave the poor nothing.

To a middle class steeped in materialism, perhaps Spencer Tunic’s nudescapes commodify communal being-ness. I can’t help but think their sensationalization appeals to the prurient. To non-Americans this is FEMEN activism stripped to nudity.

Tunic’s remote “she says” transmission to the RNC, an aerial photobomb deploying no boots on the ground, there, recalls the fairytale emperor whose imaginary attire was woven of a similar lack of substance.

Third Guy Fawkes Day case dismissed as Denver continues to arrest marchers

DENVER, COLO.- Last night Denver police mobbed a demonstration protesting the officer-involved execution of unarmed suspect Dion Avila Damon in front of his wife and child. At the end of Tuesday’s march, Robin Hamm and Nathan Stickel were arrested for obstruction, failure to obey, and destruction of private property. They were still in custody when fellow activist, Joaquin dela Torre-McNeil, arrested at an identically uneventful march last November, showed up for his court date today only to hear the city motion to dismiss his case. Joaquin was charged with interference and resisting arrest, both accusations without merit. This morning the city admitted as much.

This marks the third of nine arrests made November 5, 2015 which have been dismissed. Peter Lewis, 31, was snagged as an obstructee, then detained on a possessions charge until all charges were dropped November 20. Brandon Deaton, 24, was charged with obstruction. He was represented by attorney Frank Ingham and his case was dismissed March 23.

Joaquin’s dismissal bodes well for the remaining six cases, which are equally unfounded.

Four are charged with interference and obstruction, plus the odd sundry misdemeanor: David Croisant, 29, is represented by attorney Birk Baumgardner; Selayna Bechtold, 19, is represented by Venkatesh Iyer; Mark Iannicelli, 58, is represented by Katayoun Donnelly; and Justin Berding, 25, is represented by Cheri Deatsch.

Two are charged with felonies: Damian Stasek, 25, represented by attorney Lon Heymann; and Jake Pauly, 25. Both are charged with assault of a peace officer, which happens whenever physical contact is not initiated by the police, although in both cases this was a technicality.

Bumping into police officers is going to happen if they get in your way, especially when they have no right to get in your way, given that your first amendment right was the reason they were supposed to stay out of your way. If there’s no obstruction, there’s no interference, and your collision with their obstruction of your civil liberties is not assault.

The November 5th march was uneventful except for the arrests. There was neither property damaged, traffic impeded, nor lives endangered. The police acted purely to intimidate and squelch protest. They succeeded but now the courts are not supporting their actions. As charges fall, the accusations lose veracity. Certainly the crowd’s anger at their demonstration being curtailed with such heavy-handedness is being shown to having been legitimate. You can’t arrest people for objecting to your unlawful conduct.

But DPD hasn’t been taught that lesson yet. Last night’s march for DPD victim Dion Avila Damon was equally harmless. Arrests were made for the usual show of force. Two activists remain in custody. The bureaucratic delay is now excused as a 24-hour processing requirement for fingerprints to clear the system. Only then will bonds be calculated and allowed to be posted. Detainees will then wait a minimum of five further hours to be released. When last night’s charges are dismissed, Denver will have to account for two more wrongful imprisonment cases.

Occupy Denver’s Caryn Sodaro was rail-roaded again by Denver courts


DENVER, COLORADO- Weld County had twice declined to remit jailed Occupy Denver activist Caryn Sodaro to the Denver County courts for outstanding cases, but this week authorities conspired to bus Caryn to court without giving public notice. Instead of being greeted by a room full of supporters who had twice turned up to cheer for her as she faced contrived and punitive charges, Caryn was whisked before Judges Rodarte in 3F and Farrenger in 3H. Alone and no doubt demoralized, Caryn plead guilty to both obstruction and making threats, accepting concurrent sentences of 150 days. We haven’t yet uncovered the paper trail for her off-leash citation. but the Lindsey Flanigan Star Chamber probably threw that at her too.

Caryn’s cases had been continued to the week of December 7, but the criminal justice complex broke the rules, Caryn, and us too. Caryn Sorado had been unreachable for a week at the jail in Greeley. No one had been able to reach her. Inquiries had just been made to her case manager.

Caryn could not have know that last week Monk beat the obstruction charge.

And Caryn never made the threat of which she was accused, in fact it was the reverse. The addict who made the complaint had been evicted from our protest encampment by Caryn. The accuser hoped to get a protection order to keep Caryn away from the protest while she, the accuser, moved back in. Caryn had intended to repudiate the charge. Actually we were all certain the addict would not turn up in court.

Instead Caryn followed some court employee’s advice and doubled her jail stay-cation. Friends are planning a road trip to Greeley for a visitation and maybe cacophonous serenade, not to mention, desperate apologies for having been conned by the justice system.

Tragically a number of us were flyering outside the courthouse on Wednesday precisely when Caryn was being railroaded inside. We only learned of her appearance when checking on another schedule anomaly that afternoon, a scheduling ambush actually.

We’re coming to understand that the Denver Sheriffs play underhanded shell-games with detainees to maximize the inconvenience for inmates and loved ones alike.

The good news is that today we filed two complaints with the Office of the Independent Monitor directed at Denver Sheriff malfeasance. Both are cases of warrantless detention. Dead-nuts, incarceration without the authority to do it. More filings are in the works addressing bond-setting abuses and arbitrary release delays. Now we’ll throw Caryn’s habeas violation in for good measure. Occupy Denver may be going without Caryn’s loud angry voice, but we’re still hitting the Blue Meanies hard, and we’re as unpopular as ever.

Video evidence supports uncompelling theory that ISIS is an army of one

ISIS beheading videoWestern warmongers have caught on to viral videos for scaring up public support for military airstrikes against Iraq and Syria. So far three videos have emerged appearing to show a Western captive being beheaded by a faceless executioner presumed to represent “the Islamic State”. Though viewers are purported to be screaming for Islamic blood, the evidence at hand doesn’t implicate more than one person, himself faceless and of indeterminate identity, nationality and religious preference. It could be Mr. Califate himself, if the video is genuine –as usual we have only the CIA’s word on that– or it could be a mercenary under anyone’s employ. Apparently experts are convinced this is provocation enough to launch a war. I say, let the US and its military allies show the intellectual honesty to release videos of detainees they’ve tortured or of families they’ve executed with drones. If videotaped atrocities are going to govern international policy, let the global viewership determine whose side of the war they want to be on.

Denver march against police brutality interrupted by a DPD demonstration

DENVER, COLO.- Saturday’s “Every 5th” Anonymous march didn’t get two blocks along the 16th Street Mall before Denver police officers advanced into the compact procession to extract what looked to be targeted activists. Said one Anon: “One minute we were chanting ‘FUCK THE POLICE’ and the next they were fucking themselves! Our demonstration AGAINST police brutality was in solidarity with the New Mexico action #OpAlbuquerque, but became a demonstration OF police brutality. Thank you DPD!” Hundreds of downtown shoppers were drawn to the shit show, to see four dozen masked protesters menaced by a paramilitary force three times the size, ostensibly for jaywalking.

Local news outlets reported that the marchers were diverted from the pedestrian mall when their path was blocked by a dense row of police. Officers made five quick arrests, spraying pepper spray into the faces of marchers who weren’t accommodating their unprovoked, seemingly arbitrary snatch and grab maneuver.

ftp-nmt-dpd-arrestee-groundA few minutes later, with tension waning, the DPD made an odd sixth arrest, tackling an unrelated passerby who suddenly bolted from between their ranks. Whether opportune or calculated, the officers piled on this small man which provoked the crowd to close in on the action and boo. This resembled an attempt to incite obstruction, to provide a pretext for a police escalation, because the little man’s curious entrance coincided with a squad of riot cops already dismounting from the sideboards of their SUVs, in formation to march but without a situtation to warrant it. Let’s also add that the mystery arrestee was cop-shaped and was led off in a different direction than the other detainees.

There was plenty of shouting “FUCK THE DPD” but protesters didn’t take the bait, hardly resembling the riotous mob the DPD pretended them to be. Instead Denver citizens were treated to a front row DPD command performance of “SHOW ME WHAT A POLICE STATE LOOKS LIKE.”

For me, the FTP message resonates on more levels than the delightfully juvenile. The DPD show of force makes a regular cameo at every political demonstration. Often the military equipment is kept around the corner, but the oppressive presence is made felt. After DPD brutally squashed the Occupy demonstrations of 2011, even activists are deterred from joining protests in large numbers because of the eminent threat of police violence. The ever present police escorts which tail protest marches also taint demonstrators with the implication that their legal assembly verges on illegality. No matter what your issue, the police are going to stand in your way.

Though unpopular with the nonviolence zealots who consider it more effective to be non-confrontational, the FTP theme has become universal across activist disciplines, even with those one might presume were uninitiated. Obviously police violence extends well beyond the curtailment of civil liberties. Earlier on Saturday a group of Colorado Springs Anons stood before the CSPD HQ with a sign than read only “FTP”. It was complemented with posters that tempered the message for the city’s more conservative population, such as “Free the Prisons” and “Failed the People”. Yet countless passing motorists responded by rolling down their windows and pumping their fists shouting “Fuck the Police!”

More photos from Denver Anon and photog Stuart Sipkin.

Here’s the official 4/5 press release, reproduced from Pastebin:

Anonymous Police Brutality Protest/#Every5th/@AnarchoAnon

MEDIA ALERT
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Contact: anarchoanon@riseup.net / @AnarchoAnon

Denver 4/5—Police in Denver violently attacked a protest march against police brutality on the Downtown 16th street mall a few minutes after it began at 5:30 pm. 6 arrests took place, with police violently tackling individuals in the crowd and spraying pepper spray at protesters and bystanders. A witness said that several of those arrested were passers-by who were not involved in the protest. This protest, called by the informal net-based group known as “Anonymous,” was part of the “Every 5th” event series, in which protesters have gathered downtown on the 5th of every month to protest various issues since November 5, 2013. This particular march was planned in solidarity with protests over a recent police murder of a homeless man in Albuquerque, New Mexico, with an eye to similar ongoing police brutality issues in Denver.

“The Albuquerque Police Department has come under federal scrutiny for being involved in 37 shootings since 2010, 23 of them fatal.” (Democracy Now)

One participant said: “There were about 50 of us at the march. We peacefully marched from Civic Center Park to the 16th st mall, our usual march route. As soon as we turned off the mall, police officers violently tackled individuals, swung clubs at others, and sprayed clouds of pepper spray at the crowd. They then formed a line and took out rubber bullet guns, and continued to try to antagonize the crowd. The crowd grew larger as pedestrians became alarmed by the aggressive behavior of the Denver Police Department. There were also numerous military-style vehicles present with SWAT officers riding on the outside. This seems to be a deliberately intimidating response in which DPD is trying to send a strong message to the citizens of their city that the police will not tolerate people speaking out against police brutality. Despite the police violence, our march continued successfully for several hours, snaking through city streets, denouncing police brutality with chants and fliers. This sort of behavior by the police really only serves to promote our protest, and as we saw today, it actually encourages people to join us.”

UPDATE:

All 6 who were wrongfully arrested have plead not guilty and have been released on bond/PR and reported back the following:

Police kept insisting the protestors’ water bottles in their backpacks were “molotov cocktails” even after smelling the water. Repeatedly.

They were taken to what appeared to be a mass arrest area that had been set up in advance. There was a table piled with sandwiches and frosted cupcakes. When asked by one of the protesters if the cupcakes had been made especially for the occasion. A cop responded “Yes, there are cupcakes. And they aren’t for you!”

One Denver Sheriff was heard bragging in the jail to another sheriff about how he had just said to one of the cuffed arrestees “I can beat the shit out of you and won’t even lose my job. Nothing will happen to me.”

Multiple photos of direct police interaction during the protest were deleted off of one of the arrestee’s cameras.

When one bystander tried to ask a question about the protest, he was called homophobic and sexist slurs by the police as he was being arrested.

Regardless of arguments about reforming the police versus abolishing them altogether one thing the protesters are in agreement about is that DPD acts like a gang of terrorists who aren’t accountable in any way to the people they purport to “Protect and Serve.

Archived livestream footage clips from march: http://www.ustream.tv/channel/anarcho-anon

Twitter handles with details from the event: @anarchoanon @standupdenver @mcsole @occupydenver @internerve

Collaborators, rats and pigs

I found this unsigned flier in Denver, a collage of the American eagle, globe in mouth, and Stars & Stripes over US misdeeds, clockwise from top left: race lynching, branding slaves, blindfolded Iraqi detainees, combatant corpse desecration, Hiroshima, torture of Viet Cong, My Lai, Columbus’ mass burning of Taíno Indians, Filipino insurgents executed in trenches, the gruesome trophy pic, etc, framing this succinct condemnation: “The US military, intelligence operatives, and police are traitors to humanity. Those who work with them, those who friend them, and those who sleep with them are collaborators. They are rats and pigs.”

The guard towers of Camp Amache, CO, Japanese-American internment camp

Visitors to what remains of the WWII-era Granada Relocation Center located on Highway 50 past Lamar, are tempted to conclude that the remote location was isolation enough to restrict the movement of its 7,000 Japanese-American internees. Gone are all 560 buildings except their concrete foundations; the few remaining photographs depict a vast layout of spartan barracks, playing host to ordinary civilian lives, minus the atmosphere of incarceration. Were there cyclone fences and watch towers? The answer should not surprise you. Of course. Camp Amache was ringed by the usual multiple perimeters of prison fences, including six watch towers manned by military police, who were there, it was explained, for the internees’ protection. I think plans to further restore Amache need to begin with the security fortifications. If such blights on American history as these race-based detention centers are memorialized in the hope that our nation not do it again, it dishonors our victims, and blunts the lesson, not to illustrate our heavy hand.

I attended a recent screening of a documentary made of Camp Amache, attended by its producers, who expressed the usual motivation: in remembrance, never again. Special emphasis was placed on the contributions made by Japanese-Americans during the war, and on the magnanimity with which the internees accepted their lot. Survivors were not to receive an official apology until 45 years later, given $20,000 restitution for their livelihoods and families destroyed. It would be safe to say the audience felt well beyond the prejudice that had motivated their parents. Against Japanese-Americans.

Unfortunately both the documentary and the filmmakers’ commentary left the impression that “never again” describes a successful holding pattern. Of course, America has been at it again and as usual, its citizens have been obliviously complicit.

Look at the War on Islam, which has necessitated the internment of Muslim-Americans and Muslims worldwide. Guantanamo is not much different from the Wartime Relocation Authority (WRA) special Isolation Centers such as Dalton Wells, near Moab, where the WRA sent internees profiled as potential insurgency threats.

America has been building a network of fresh detention facilities to house Hispanic-Americans who run afoul of the country’s illegal labor market. Most of the detainees are promptly deported, but many languish while immigration issues and family ties are sorted out. While ICE pretends to protect the American people from the security-threatening unlawfulness of illegal aliens, in reality its detention centers enforce the successful abuse of a Hispanic-American slave labor pool.

You need only visit a traditional prison or jail to see that an overwhelming disproportion of its inmates are African-American and Hispanic-American, far exceeding what can be excused as representative of America’s poor. The American judicial system is still stacked against non-whites, and motivated by the same racist premise of protecting the security of white Americans.

And of course there are the open air prisons which still incarcerate the Native-Americans, the internment camps we call reservations, the original Wartime Relocation Centers.

It’s the 9th anniversary of our illegal prison: Close Guantanamo Asshole!

Is that disrespectful? IS THAT BEING TOO IMPOLITE? Is that showing INSUFFICIENT DEFERENCE TO THE TORTURER-IN-CHIEF? –who promised to close Guantanamo two years earlier but avers now because he was not allocated the funds to lock-up the prisoners elsewhere, or can’t find courts for his kangaroos, because this president thinks don’t do illegal detention, rendition and torture means don’t do it where we can see you. CLOSE IT. Take Gitmo’s remaining operating budget and fly the whole camp home. THEN, then hold a huge gala fundraiser, several million dollars a plate, where all your warmonger and torture cronies and their spouses can hold a raffle for one lucky couple to MAYBE be granted amnesty against charges of war crimes. How’s that for an exit strategy? Last chance. THEN take the sum raised as an offering to the freed detainees, prostrate yourself to beg their forgiveness –how could you not mean it?– and dare not begrudge even one of the unfortunate souls who might demand your heads on a platter in the bargain. IN THE MEANTIME, I’ll think on whether I’m showing disrespect.

Which evil empire let mothers visit their detainee spy-terrorists?

Did you see the heart-rendering coverage about the mothers permitted to visit their detained sons? With the sound turned off, I missed some of it… After long months/years of petitioning a belligerent government, the tearful mothers of hostages/detainees being held on espionage-charges/no-charges were at last granted permission to see their sons and daughter. Tehran’s compassionate act is derided as serving a propaganda agenda. Guantanamo, on the safe side, has no plans to show any compassion at all.

Of course, our lads were simply “hikers” exploring a remote border of Iran, alleged to have crossed over while on an outing. For day jobs they reported for US corporate media outlets whose role it has been to glorify US war efforts and are currently agitating for an attack on Iran.

None of their boys on the other hand were apprehended on our soil. Instead they were caught defending their own land, accused of acts which our soldier-invaders commit everyday many times over. And their civilian cover is usually taxi-driver or stall-keeper, for most of them we don’t even know, so determined is the US about keeping their imprisonment a secret.

Can you guess the guest of which state are also tortured?

Should US torturers of 15-year-old combatant Omar Khadir stay unnamed?

Extending the jurisdiction of military tribunals to civilians and adversaries is not simply unpopular, it’s illegal, and America’s kangaroo courts in Guantanamo mock even self respect. Right now we’re prosecuting Afghanistan combatant Omar Khadr, captured when he was age 15, for lobbing a grenade toward US invaders (are any of our GIs guilty of less?) meanwhile obscuring the identity of American soldiers culpable of torture and murder. Last week four key reporters were banned from Guantanamo proceedings for having revealed the name of “Interrogator #1” guilty of past episodes for abuse of detainees including a death. His name: US Army Specialist Joshua Claus.

How many of these anonymity-seeking torturers can we out on the web? From mercenaries to repentant vets, the least we can do for the memories of their victims and their captives’ loved ones is to publish their identities in public.

You might see the wisdom in protecting the confidentiality of witnesses who were victims of sexual abuse, but perps? Of course a chief problem of military tribunals in addition to permitting testimony obtained through torture is the use of unnamed accusers. Convictions obtained through tribunals will stand up so long as the USA reigns omniscient, but in the eyes of international justice, the US and its torturers remain criminals at large.

Navy wants immunity for its alibis

There are apparently five navy servicemen who say they can exonerate the Navy Seals accused of beating Iraqi suspect Ahmed Hashim Abed in 2004. But they won’t testify unless granted immunity from prosecution. Say what? Their alibi is illegal? I’ll confess to writing John Yoo’s torture memo if I can be indemnified from responsibility. Wait, Yoo and his lawless wild bunch were let off the hook. And the civil case against Guantanamo for its detainees suicided in interrogation was dismissed. US law down the rabbit hole. Off with their heads — except Americans!

Closing Gitmo not opening it wide

Not only is the infamous Guantanamo prison camp NOT CLOSING, its criminal record grows, and now the illegal facility is being expanded to lasso Haitian migrants escaping the devastation of Haiti’s earthquake. Will they be tortured as well? The way Obama is moving on civil rights, we may never know.

We have learned that three of the prison’s suicides, the mysterious coordinated attack of suicide-suiciders for which US military spokesmen accused the detainees of asymmetric warfare, were actually deaths at the hands of torturers. Though officials claimed to have discovered the bodies in their cells, camp guards have revealed that the prisoners were actually taken from the interrogation rooms, having suffocated from water-boarding. Coroners trying to establish the causes of death were hampered by the fact that Gitmo physicians had surgically removed key telltale body parts in the interest of national security.

Diverting attention from the murder story are preparations to expand Guantanamo to greet an anticipated wave of Haitian migrant refugees escaping the earthquake devastation. Just part of the militarization of aid giving.

A processing center is being readied at Guantanamo where Haitians can be returned to Haiti nearly as soon as they are intercepted at sea. Ever gracious, the US reveals that some Haitians will be considered for entry to the US. Temporary work permits will be granted to some Haitians, but only those who can show that they were in the US at the time of the January 12 earthquake.

Identity of CIA bomb victims spill forth

khost victim of CIA bomberUS forces in Afghanistan suffered an unprecedented setback this weekend when a suicide bomber was able to blow to smithereens a gathering of CIA operatives in an outpost in Khost Province. Seven agents were killed and six injured, and a great tragedy is that these covert deaths, like that of the security contractor killed with them, are not counted as official casualties of war, to weigh against the public conscience for us to wonder, was it worth it? These were professional killers and torturers whose names are now withheld to protect their families.

But some Americans –God bless them– will not be denied the deification of their downed warriors, and so some families have gone public about the loss of their mercenary kin. Thus we have names, and Facebook memorials, to the men and women who commit the clandestine crimes for which the rest of the world holds us accountable. But first, a word about what they were doing.

Forward Operating Base Chapman caught my attention because that’s the kind of military post which protects the celebrated school building projects of Greg Mortenson, and Khost Province is one of his territories. It turns out that the US Army is also busy [re]-building schools, and boasts 53 in Khost. Also, for reasons of deteriorating security, FOB Chapman was no longer housing US military, but instead was strictly for private firms contracted to the reconstruction, except now journalists are at liberty to say that the camp was always known to be “not regular” — code for CIA.

“Although Chapman was officially a camp for civilians involved in reconstruction, it was well-known locally as a CIA base. Over the past couple of years, it focused on gathering information on so-called high-value targets for drone attacks, the unmanned missile planes that have played a growing role in taking out suspected terrorists since President Barack Obama took office. The Haqqanis were their principal target.

” ‘That far forward they were almost certainly from the CIA’s paramilitary rather than analysts,’ said one agent.”

So FOB Chapman was used for a drone command post. Not controlling drones, but gathering intelligence about where to target their missiles. I’d be curious that what had been an “underground gym” for US soldiers, where the dozen CIA officers were meeting their informant/surprise-bomber, wasn’t being put to an altogether more menacing function by the CIA. Obviously on this particular occasion it was a briefing room/wake.

It’s conjectured that the CIA at FOB Chapman was targeted because the local Taliban had suffered one too many CIA drone attacks. Other accusations emerge that the CIA had recently killed Afghan detainees while in custody, in their effort to break the Haqqani network. One reporter’s source phrased it: “Those guys have recently been on a big Haqqani binge.”

The CIA is not releasing the name of the bomber, reportedly an informant “candidate,” but strangely his name is being reported in the Arabic press. He was a Jordanian doctor named Khalil Abu Hammam Mellal Al-Balawi, of the Beer Al-Saba’a family, codenamed “Abu Dajana Al-Kharasani,” a supervisor on the Al-Hisba internet forums, where so-called official al-Qaeda communications are regularly transmitted. His identity might explain how a visit with this “informant” warranted the attendance of a dozen agents, including a high ranking officer from Kabul and the Khost station chief.

The station chief was reported to have been an agent in Afghanistan for 14 years, since the days of the so-called Alec Station which was tasked with tracking the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden. She was a loving mother of three, so it’s possible her identity is being concealed until her family can be extracted from the region.

The first agent to be identified publicly was Harold Brown Jr., 37, of Bolton, Mass., whose father thought he worked for the State Department. Before the “State Department,” Brown worked for Science Applications International Corp.

The next to be identified was Scott Michael Roberson, 39, of Akron, Ohio. He was a policeman when he wasn’t a CIA security officer. Robertson co-founded the Metro Atlanta Police Emerald Society and was a member of the Iron Pigs, a national motorcycle club for police and firefighters.

Another of the CIA agents wasn’t American at all, but a member of the Jordanian royal family. The body of Capitan As-Sharif Ali bin Zeid Al Awn has been returned to Jordan with much pomp and ceremony, without an official report of the incidence of his death, the family unable to explain what he was doing in Afghanistan, except to deny accusations that he was employed by the CIA.

The lone non-CIA victim was security contractor and former Navy SEAL, Jeremy Jason Wise, 35, of Virginia Beach. Wrote the WSJ: “Today, the CIA and President Obama acknowledged that seven of those killed were CIA agents. No one would say who employed the eighth American.”

(Except he was really the seventh American, because one of the dead was a Jordanian.)

UPDATE: It’s now revealed that Jeremy Wise was employed by Xe/Blackwater, who admit now that two of the CIA victims were Blackwater.

With suicide bombers all over the news, from the successful to the pantywaist, as blogs spill over with nuke-em-all comments which reveal Americans seem perfectly comfortable with the idea that peoples are collectively accountable for the deeds of criminals among them.

Or the deeds of insurgents aka freedom fighters, about whom you or I might disagree.

US Blackwater goons for example, have been let off the hook for the Nisour Square atrocity in Iraq. According to our neoliberal world order, Iraq should be able to track miscreants with drones, and since we refuse to bring them to justice, lay waste entire American neighborhoods and schools if informants report they are nearby.

I’ve certainly always argued that Americans are all of us responsible for the crimes our government is committing. Even with our combatant criminals killed in battle, I’m not sure that the people who cheered them on don’t still owe their victims responsibility.

New ICE building is half windowless

ice offices in pueblo bank trust buildingAs reported by the Gazette on Nov 30, the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) division of the Department of Homeland Security has opened an office in Colorado Springs in the Pueblo Bank and Trust Building. The implication is of a lonely field office to monitor the busy I-25 corridor, but the Nation Magazine is reporting that ICE locations nationwide are being used as unmarked and unmonitored detention facilities for undisclosed detainees. I can’t vouch for ours. Anyone up for a photo field trip? Bring your papers.

According to the Gazette, the office has been a pet pork project of Congressman Doug Lamborn. Their description of the new facilities:

The downtown office in Colorado Springs is the ninth ICE office in Colorado and houses several cubicles and conference rooms as well as a cache of secure rooms to be used for interviews, confidential paperwork and holding weapons.

Detentions have been until now subcontracted with El Paso County. Currently the county holds approximately 150 detainees for ICE.

Did you catch this choice segment of the story? County Commissioner Jim Bensberg apparently confuses “to have a chilling effect” with crime deterrence:

“The presence of the federal office will have a chilling effect on a wide variety of activities,” he said, without elaborating.

“There were days I thought this would never happen,” he said. “If I had a tail right now, I’d be wagging it.”

NY trial no threat for Guantanamo 5

BUSH REGIME ENGINEERED 9-11Whatsa matter Mayor Giuliani? Are you afraid if the 9/11 suspects come to trial in NYC, that these 9/11 TRUTH fellows might turn up? It was your Ground Zero hero’s launchpad, this time it may be theirs.

You and the media paint the Guantanamo 5 as guilty, without a trial. Sarah Palin would like to see them executed before a trial, allegedly. We can grant her the benefit of the doubt to not have said something so callous, but there’s no charity left for ragheads. Maybe a drone outfit could target Guantanamo, and we’d be spared having to incarcerate its inmates elsewhere. The detainees have already served eight years of inhumane detention and torture. I’m very enthused to see them get a day in court. They’re what, innocent until proven guilty, so that makes them suspects, at best alleged terrorists. You call them terrorists, but at worst they are terror conspirators. Neither are, after all, the nineteen hijackers.

Speaking of which, if you could get your hands on the hijackers who were mistakenly identified to have been on the plane, who are taunting you from their homes in the Middle East, if you could extradite them, what charges would you bring? Conspiracy to impersonate phantom bogeymen?

Normally high profile defendants plead to be tried away from the population center of their victims. For NINE ELEVEN there may be a case to make either way. The “9/11 terrorists” may face a tough crowd sourced from NY’s bitterly racist civil servants. On the other hand, the aftermath of Ground Zero has ruined a whole lot more people than were killed in the twin towers and were bought off handsomely to ask no questions.

Speaking of the 9/11 victim families, when are we going to quit asking the families about this, that, and how to proceed in Afghanistan?! We’re ALL OF US VICTIMS OF 9/11 NOW! None more than the Iraqis and Afghans, and poor people everywhere the US is prosecuting its War On Terror. They’re offered a pittance for their loses, Americans are losing sons and daughters, husbands and wives, and sometimes the survivors get a favorable insurance payout, but the rest of us get zilch, that much credit, and a broken economy. The 9/11 family survivors were compensated for the lost expected income of their darling WTC financiers, plus a little extra to stay away from the 9/11 Widows, the true patriots. Of course the war industry and its corporate media look to the 9/11 families when the public needs a booster shot of embittered venom, but why are the rest of us not laughing in derision? Come on, you fathers and mothers of bitches. You took your silver, now beat it to Cancun. No more innocents need to die because you can’t come to terms with the fact that your Little Eichmanns got their due.

The GOP culpables are wondering aloud if NYC trials for the terror suspects would in reality put America on trial. You betcha!

Usually when the posses returns with the wanted men, the deputes have to protect them from the angry mob trying to break into the jail to have a lynching. Rudy Giuliani and his GOP can see the mob already converging for the trials, and they know it’s not the Guantanamo Five they’re after.

Senators Cornyn, Smith, Lieberman, Webb, McCain, not common criminals

They want war crimes trials, then book ’em. Senators John Cornyn, Lamar Smith, Joe Lieberman, Jim Webb and John McCain have mouthed off against bringing accused 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to trial in US civilian courts. They want Mohammed and his fellow detainees tried by military tribunals, which have already been condemned as violations of international law. So has voting to support the attack on Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo, secret prisons, etc.

Forget the presumption of innocence. Said Cornyn:

“These terrorists planned and executed the mass murder of thousands of innocent Americans. Treating them like common criminals is unconscionable.”

Added Lieberman, they–

“are war criminals, not common criminals … not American citizens entitled to all the constitutional rights American citizens have in our federal courts.”

Nope, sorry it doesn’t work that way. Our constitution protects the rights of everyone under US jurisdiction. Not to mention the detainees are “alleged” criminals as well.

The senators are perhaps influenced by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s media monicker: the self proclaimed mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. That’s a rather inflated attribution based on a confession extracted after an apparently record setting series of water boarding torture sessions.

Unless Attorney General Eric Holder plans to conduct the 9/11 trials under wraps, with the sound off like the kangaroo court lynching of Saddam Hussein, this news could be the most significant development the 9/11 Truth Movement will ever get.

Next step, join the ACLU in urging Holder to try all War on Terror detainees in US civilian courts. This isn’t about keeping American citizens safe. As the Senators rightly miserly point out, this is about according the detainees sufficient rights that they might win an inconveniently fair trial.

Picture of Israeli worth 20 Palestinians

Galid Shalit kidnapped by Hamas in 2006At first glance the trade betrayed a racist inequity. This week Israel agreed to release twenty Palestinian women in exchange for one Israeli held captive by Hamas. Not for the release of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit, just for proof that he was still alive.

What is the worth of one Israeli? At first his captors demanded the release of all Palestinian women and girls. Later they asked for the release of 1,000 detainees. But the relative values are reversed. Shalit is the lone POW held by Palestine. Israel incarcerates an estimated 11,000, most detained for obstructing the construction of the Apartheid Wall. Exchanging Shalit would represent a trade of 100% for 9%. Don’t worry, Israel’s occupation forces can always capture more.

Gilad Shalit is the first IDF soldier captured by the Palestinians since 1994. Israel on the other hand, with the collaboration of Fatah, can arrest civilians whenever they choose.

Shalit’s capture is an interesting story. Israel claims to have received warning of the eminent kidnap attempt. The day before, IDF soldiers raided a house belonging to a suspected Hamas militant. They arrested his two sons, a doctor and a lawyer. Their torture allegedly extracted details of a cross-border raid. As a result, technically I suppose you could say, their intelligence officers “received warning.” However Israel was unable to thwart the tank operator’s capture.

Shalit has served as the pretext for many ensuing incursions into Gaza, at a great cost to Palestinian lives. Draw your own conclusions.

Israel propagates this story to assert that Gilad Shalit was “kidnapped,” invoking a litany of international laws which Israel wields against Hamas. With shameless hypocrisy, Israelis protest the inhumanities suffered by Shalit, ignoring the documentation of thousands of imprisoned Palestinian subjected to worse. The irony of Israel’s complaints becomes tedious: lack of International Red Cross access, parental visitation, regular correspondence, information of his exact whereabouts, etc. This in light of Israel’s refusal to permit oversight of its Palestinian detainees, or to denounce its tortures. What gall to decry the fate of one soldier, taken prisoner while on duty, with Israel’s demonstrated eagerness to expend ordnance and harass Palestinian civilians at whim.

Shalit has prompted Israel to launch aerial bombardments, and restrict border checkpoints in the effort to extort his release, or to pit Palestinian sentiments against Hamas, who refuse to release Shalit in spite of the collective punishment meted to its people.

The Israelis had reason to doubt that Gilad Shalit, captured by Hamas in 2006, was not dead. After all, the IDF was confident that their January incursion into Gaza had destroyed all known Hamas hiding places.

Military drones mirror public retreat

CLOSE GUANTANAMO is being interpreted literally, meaning close just the facility, but move the detainees to illegal incarceration elsewhere. Likewise, BRING THE TROOPS HOME means pacing a withdrawal with an increased deployment of military drones to keep up the killing. That’s what the antiwar voice gets for pandering to the American preoccupation with only our own casualties. The latest Adbusters juxtaposes these surrogate killing machines with the western public’s retreat into virtual communities.

Pblks‘ Douglas Haddow had this to say in the latest issue, about the increasing use of surveillance attack drones, while the US withdraws “troops” from its militarized war zones.

…when we remove the humans from the equation — when war becomes literally inhuman — what’s left to debate? War crimes will become guiltless: a mere twisting of knobs. Slowly, with each OS update, innocent casualties will be curbed to an acceptable level. The Marine will be replaced by the computer programmer — a meek nerd so far from the action as to be absolved completely of its consequences.

With robots off fighting our wars for us, we’ll have nothing left to do but quietly sip our lattes and liten to our iPods. While somewhere, far off in the distance, a drone may or may not be dropping 50kg units of hellfire on some yet-to-be-named combatants. It’s not even post moral … it’s a Zen algorithm that melts steel.

This is a strange indicator of our retreat into the virtual when you consider that our so-called enemies are willing to sacrifice everything, their own bodies and very existence for a chance to kill one or two of our soldiers. We see their tactics as irrational, and they see us perhaps as we already are: machines.

There is no License to Kill

“Licensed to Kill” was an Ian Fleming invention. His friend Richard Meinertzhagen dropped Fleming’s phrase for guests to infer he was a secret agent. RM’s routine of arriving at diner parties with a smoking gun reinforced whispers that he had been the inspiration for James Bond. Meinertzhagen turned out to be a flake, but the authority to play god is still coveted by espionage idolators. Federal statutes prohibit identifying covert CIA operatives, regardless what they’ve done. Is that the same thing? A mythical supra legem indemnity? Sorry Virginia, nemo est.

Okay, some today are above the law, notable examples being Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Woo, et al. The jury is still out on who will atone for the Bush Co crimes. But should the Neocon exemption cover assassination squads and torturers too?

The US Department of Justice is up in arms -Fox News probably more than anybody- having learned that defense lawyers for terrorist suspects in US custody, have shown their clients photographs of CIA and private contractor interrogators, to learn which of them might have engaged in harsh techniques defined by the rest of the world as torture.

The John Adams Project, run jointly by the ACLU and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, is an effort to document the US torture in Guantanamo and our secret prisons around the globe. The ACLU assures all indignant patriots that asking the detainees to identify their torturers is completely legal.

Researchers for the project have been snapping pictures outside the homes of retired and active, CIA and intelligence industry interrogators. No names have been released except Deuce Martinez, who’d already been outed by the NYT. Martinez was the agent responsible for interrogating Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, although accounts soft-pedal his participation in the harsher techniques.

That’s the pattern of exposes about torture, those named always claim to have left the room. A remarkably similar motif accompanied the account of CIA interrogator John Kiriakou.

Two well-known names were doctors who attended to the tortured, later opening a consulting firm to train CIA interrogators.
Dr. Jim Mitchell and Dr. Bruce Jessen specialized in maximizing harsh interrogation, and making sure the victim didn’t die.

The defense lawyers have circulated the photographs of 60 suspected perpetrators, but have named only Martinez so far. How are torturers and murderers to be brought to justice, if they are not unmasked?

Can Clinton charm Obama into freeing civilians falsely accused in Guantanamo?

You’d think the international community could have thought to do it. Ambassadorship 101: send convivial fat man to make entreaties. The US has enjoyed outrageous success springing its non-combatant innocent- trespasser media-propagandists from Iran and North Korea. The so-called axes of evil have granted special pardons to accommodate air-brained Americans, lest our public opinion start crying for blood. Evil has more grace than the US has shown for its innocent detainees in Guantanamo, which it force-feeds through hunger-strikes as they protest indefinite and wrongful internment. But when our enemies release their captives, we call it saving face.

Now of course Iran is faced with the capture of three more itinerants, hikers Shane Bauer, Sarah Shourd and Joshua Fattal. And lo, Bauer is now revealed to be a journalist for New American Media. Easily confused with Laura Ling and Euna Lee’s “Current Media LLC?”

[UPDATE 1: NOW TWO of the hikers are known to be journalists, having reported about Genocide in Darfur and the Golan Heights, among other US State Dept approved stories.
UPDATE 2: NOW media mouthpieces are expressing fears that delicate information carried by Laura Ling and Euna Lee about North Korea escape routes was uncovered by their NK captors. Meaning… uh, Ling and Lee were actually working against NK interests after all?]

The three –how improbable– Berkeley grads were apprehended where the US military has long admitted to be operating special forces. Are we to expect that all US commandos do not have a media-ready cover? What are the Delta Forces but American recreation nuts, crazy for outdoor hardship and manly games with knives and balaclavas?

Only Burma stand obstinate, determined that Mormon-playing-idiot John Yettaw, is more a bumbling Hasenfus than an Aung San Suu Kyi groupie. The bumbling, epileptic ideologue archetype serves America well when its intelligence agents are apprehended. Was Yettaw trying to spring Suu Kyi, or was he there to trip the wires and send the iconic freedom worker to prison?

No. 1 domestic terrorist Daniel McGowan

The Huffington Post published a letter by ELF/ALF political prisoner Daniel McGowan, who is allowed to send one letter per week from CMU36, the controversial “Communication Management Unit” whose cover-name is USP Marion. According to McGowan, prison guards call it the “I Unit,” which probably does not stand for illegal.

As of May 2009, I have been at USP Marion’s “Communication Management Unit,” or CMU, for roughly nine months and now is a good time to address the misconceptions (and the silence) regarding this unit. I want to offer a snapshot of my day-to-day life here as well as some analysis of what the existence of CMUs in the federal prison system implies. It is my hope that this article will partially fill the void of information that exists concerning the CMU, will help dispel rumors, and will inspire you to support those of us on the inside fighting the existence of these isolation units — in the courts and in the realm of public opinion.

It is best to start from the beginning — or at least where my story and the CMU meet. My transfer here is no different from that of many of the men here who were living at Federal Correctional Institutions (normal prisons) prior to the genesis of the CMUs. On May 12, 2008, on my way back from a decent lunch, I was told to report to “R&D” (receiving and discharge). I was given two boxes and half an hour to pack up my meager possessions. After complying I was placed in the SHU (secure housing unit or “hole”) and put on a bus the next day. There was no hearing and no information given to me or my attorneys — only after a day was I told I was on my way to Marion, Illinois’ CMU.

Hearing the term “CMU” made my knees buckle as it drummed up some memory I had of the infamous “control units” at Marion (closed in 1995 and replaced by Florence ADX: the lone Federal “Supermax” prison). Then it hit me. The lawyers, in challenging the application of the terrorist enhancement in my case, made the prescient argument that if I receive the enhancement, the Bureau of Prisons (BoP) would use that to place me in the CMU at FCI Terre Haute, Indiana (at the time just 5 months old). In fact, on the way to FCI Sandstone in August 2007, I not only saw the CMU but met one of its residents while in transit. Let me back up and offer a brief history of the Communication Management Units.

The CMU I reside in, at USP Marion, received its first prisoner in May 2008 and when I arrived, held about 17 men, the majority of whom were Muslim. Currently, the unit has 25, with a capacity of 52 cells. In April 2009, we received seven new people, all of whom were from the CMU at FCI Terre Haute. The unit is overwhelmingly Muslim with 18 men identifying as such. Most, but not all of the prison, have so-called terrorism cases. According to a BoP spokesperson, the unit “will not be limited to inmates convicted of terrorism-related cases through all of the prisoners fit that description.” Others have prison disciplinary violation or allegations related to communication and the misuse of telephones etc. Here, almost everyone has a terrorism related case — whether it is like my case (destruction of property characterized as “domestic terrorism”) or conspiracy and “providing material aid” cases.

Before the Marion CMU opened, there was the original CMU, opened in December 2006 at the former death row at FCI Terre Haute. According to early articles, the unit was intended for “second tier terrorism inmates, most of them Arab Muslims and a less restrictive version of the Supermax in Florence, Colorado.”

Additionally, BoP Director Harley Lappin, in a July 2008 hearing on the 2009 BoP budget request, said of the CMUs, “A lot of the more serious offenders, terrorists, were housed at ADX Florence. So, we are ramping up two communications management units that are less restrictive but will ensure that all mail and phone calls of the offenders are monitored on a daily basis.”

Terre Haute’s CMU has 36 men (27 of whom are Muslim) and is roughly comparable to Marion’s CMU. The rest of this place focuses on the latter, in which I have resided and of which I have seen firsthand.

You may be curious about just what a CMU actually is. From my correspondence, I can tell that many correspondents do not know much about what goes on here. I hope this can clear up any misperceptions. According to the BoP,

The CMU is [sic] established to house inmates who, due to their current offense of conviction, offense conduct or other verified information, require increased monitoring of communication between inmates and persons in the community in order to protect the safety, security, and orderly operations of Bureau facilities and protect the public…The CMU is a self-contained general population housing unit.

There are, of course, alternate views to the above definition including the belief that the CMUs are Muslim units, a political prisoner unit (similar to the HSU operated by the BoP in the 80’s, and a punishment unit.

The CMUs have an extremely high Muslim population; here at Marion, it is 65-75%. An overrepresentation of any one demographic in a prison raises constitutional issues of equal protection as well as safety issues. Nowhere in the BoP will you find any group represented in such extreme disproportion. To counter these claims, the BoP brought in a small number of non-Muslims to be used as proof that the units are not strictly Muslim (an interesting note is that some of the Muslim men here have cases unrelated to terrorism). Does the inclusion of six people that are non-Muslim really negate the claim of segregation though? What are the criteria for determining who comes to the CMU? The BoP claims there are 211 international terrorists (and 1000 domestic terrorists) in their system. Yet, the CMUs have no more than 60 men at the present time. Where are the rest of these people? How does the BOP determine who of those 1200 are sent to a CMU and who to normal prisons? These are questions that need to be asked — in court and in the media.

Many of the men here (both Muslim and non) are considered political prisoners in their respective movements and have been engaged in social justice, religious organizations, charities and humanitarian efforts. Another conception of the CMU is that it is a location designed to isolate us from our movements and to act as a deterrent for others from those movements (as in “step outside the line and you too will end up there”). The intended effect of long-term housing of this kind is a profound sense of dislocation and alienation. With your mail, email, phones, and visits monitored and no human touch allowed at the visits, it is difficult to feel a connection to “the streets.” There is historical evidence of the BoP utilizing political prisons — despite the fact that the Department of Justice refuses to acknowledge the concept of political prisoners in US prisons, choosing to call us “criminal” instead.

The Lexington High Security Unit (HSU) was one such example. Having opened its 16-bed facilities in 1988 and housing a number of female political prisoners, the HSU functioned as an isolation unit — underground, bathed in fluorescence, and limited interaction with staff. In the opinion of Dr. Richard Korn, speaking on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union, the unit’s goal was “…to reduce prisoners to a state of submission essential for their ideological conversion. That failing, the next objective is to reduce them as efficient, self-directing antagonists. That failing, the only alternative is to destroy them by making them destroy themselves.”

After an arduous campaign by human rights advocates and supporters, the BoP capitulated, stating it would close its facility (when it did not, it was sued). The judge ruled that the plaintiffs were illegally designated based on their past political affiliations, statements and political beliefs. The unit was closed and the women were transferred to other prisons.

The correlations between the HSU and CMU are many and seem to have some of the same goals as well as methods used to designate us here. Knowing they are dealing with people committed to ideals and the movements they are a part of, we were placed here in order to weaken those connections and harm our relationships. An example is the horrendous strain that the CMU puts on our familial relations — especially our marriages. It was certainly considered by the architects of the CMU that preventing visits that allow human touch for long-term prisoners would have a disastrous impact on our relationships and would lead to weaker inmates.

Finally, the CMU can be viewed as “the stick” — a punitive unit for those who don’t play ball or who continue to express political beliefs anathema to the BoP or the US government. Although I am not aware of the BoP’s criteria for sending people here (due to their refusal to release specific CMU information), it is curious who is and who is not here. Out of roughly 18 codefendants in my criminal case, I am the only one at a CMU (the remainder of them are at low and medium security prisons). The same goes for a member of the SHAC7 campaign, Andrew Stepanian, one of 6 defendants in his case who was sent here for the last 6 months of his sentence. Other men here have codefendants at the Terre Haute CMU while others have codefendants at normal federal prisons. Despite numerous Freedom of Information Requests, the BoP refuses to grant the documents that specify the rules governing transfer to the CMU. Remember, hardly any of the men here have received any disciplinary violations and some have been in general population over 15 years! How can someone be okay in general population for that long and then one day be seen as a communication threat?

So, I have hypothesized about the goals of the CMU. Let me discuss the many problems and injustices associated with the existence of the CMUs.

Due process
More appropriately, a lack thereof. A term I never thought much about before my imprisonment, due process is:

…the conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and principles for the protection and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the right to hearing before a tribunal [my emphasis] with the power to decide the case.

I was moved from FCI Sandstone, against my will and at a moment’s notice, with no hearing and thus no chance to contest the reason for my transfer. A FOIA request recently received states I was redesignated May 6th, my transfer was signed the next day and I was moved on May 13th with the reason given as “program participation”. Since I got here, I have not had a hearing to contest the claims made in the “Notice to Inmate of Transfer to CMU, ” some of which were woefully inaccurate. Instead, I was told I can utilize the administrative remedy process (which I have done to no avail) and request a transfer after 18 months of “clear conduct”.

The irony is that all prisoners who violate prison rules are subject to a series of disciplinary hearings in which they could offer their defense. For legal units such as Florence ADX (Supermax) or the control unit program, there exists a codified set of rules and hearings for transfer to these locations. The BoP has deliberately ignored this process and has instead transferred us to this special, brand-new CMU without due process. My notice of transfer was given to me 12 days after I arrived!

Similar to the callous disregard for due process (and the US Constitution), there is no “step down” process for the CMU. Unlike the ones that exist at Florence ADX, control units or even the gang units, the CMU has no stages, no requisite amount of time we are to spend here before being sent back to a normal prison.

Because these preceding programs are specifically for prison misbehavior, there is a logical and orderly way to finish the program and eventually transfer. For us, the BoP has set up a paradox — if we are here for our offense conduct, which we cannot ever change, how can we reasonably leave the unit? In its “Admissions and Orientation” guide for Marion’s CMU, here is what they say:

Every new commitment to the CMU will be evaluated by his unit team regarding his suitability for incarceration in this institution. If, for some reason, the inmate is deemed not acceptable for confinement in this unit, he will be processed as expeditiously as possible…

[I am still roughly 10 months from my 18-month period in which I must wait before requesting a transfer. Considering the fact that all my remedies have been denied, I am not hopeful about this.]

CMU as Secret
In addition to the due process and transfer issues, there is the secretive and illegal manner that the CMU was created (Note: for historical perspectives, it needs to be stated that the CMU was established roughly halfway through the second term of George W. Bush and his Attorney General Alberto Gonzales.)

In April 2006, the BoP proposed a “Limited Communication for Terrorist Inmates” policy, which suggested new restrictions for “terrorists” and “terrorism related inmates” such as:

1) One 6-page letter per week.

2) One 15-minute phone call a month.

3) One 1-hour visit a month.

A coalition of civil rights organizations signed a letter of protest criticizing the proposed rules and raising numerous constitutional, practical and ethical objectives. The outcry appears to have caused the BoP to reconsider it and just 6 months later, open the CMU at FCI Terre Haute quietly. Since the BoP never sought public comment on the new CMU, it certainly appears to be a violation of the Administrative Procedural Act (APA), an argument a federal judge in Miami raised in response to a prisoner’s legal challenge to transfer to the CMU.

The unit is functionally an open secret. While the BoP circumvented the standard public comment (and feedback process), it has sought to get around this by describing the CMU as a “self-contained general population unit,” implying that the unit is legally and penally no different than a normal unit at an FCI. There is no mention of the CMU on the BoP’s website (ww.bop.gov) or USP Marion’s subpage on the same site. You will not find extensive Congressional hearings on the subject — other than a July 2008 subcommittee hearing in which it appears that the BoP director was not fully forthcoming on the CMU36. Letters here are stamped “USP Marion,” not CMU, and the unit is called “I Unit” by staff. (An interesting anecdote: while on transit in Winter 2009, I met men from the FCI here and asked them what they knew about I Unit. Without hesitation, they said, “That’s where the terrorists are.” They informed me this is what BoP Staff routinely told them.)

Media queries are met with silence or vague information. Requests by the media to interview me by coming to Marion have been denied — due to it “being detrimental to the safety, security and good order of the institution.” There still is no Program Statement on the CMU — a legal requirement, outlining the specific rules of the CMU and its designation criteria.

Because of this, and the general refusal of the BoP to hand over relevant documents through FOIA, it is impossible to determine the specific reasons why one is sent here — and thus, how to contest this process. In effect, the CMU was created on the fly, with no eye toward legality; they are free to operate it in whatever manner they choose.

Communication Management (The Promotion of Isolation and Alienation)
The most painful aspect of this unit, to me, is how the CMU restricts my contact with the world beyond these walls. It is difficult for those who have not known prison to understand what a lifeline contact with our family and friends is to us. It is our link to the world — and our future (for those of us who are fortunate enough to have release dates). Prison authorities and architects are well aware that those with strong family ties and in good communication with their loved ones are well behaved and have significantly lower rates of recidivism. The BoP, in theory, recognizes this by claiming they try to situate us within 500 miles of our homes. Mostly, this is a cruel farce for many prisoners — I have not been within 1000 miles of my family in 2 years.

The most Orwellian aspects of the CMU are in how they manage our communications:

A) Telephones- at my previous prison, I was able to use the phones for 300 minutes a month — days, nights, weekends and holidays — basically at any point I was not in my housing unit (6am-10pm). Here, we receive one 15-minute phone call a week. The call can only take place between 8am and 2:30pm, never on weekends or holidays and must be scheduled one and a half weeks in advance (we can choose a back-up number to call but if neither picks up, we don’t get a call). The call is live-monitored and recorded. Not only do we receive one fifth of the minutes granted to other federal prisoners but the call is also very trying for our families — all of whom have day jobs and many of whom have children in school. The CMU requires calls be made in English only — a difficult demand considering over half of the men here speak English as a second language (this restriction is not present at other federal prisons).

B) Visits- At FCI Sandstone, I received up to eight visiting days a month (56 hours) — contact visits in which I could embrace my wife, play cards with my nieces and share vending machine food with my visitors. These visits were my lifeline. I got about twelve of them in eight months and it aided in my adjustment to prison.

The CMU restricts our visits to one four-hour non-contract visit a month. One short visit through two inches of plate glass with cameras hanging overhead and my visitors stuffed in a four-and-a-half by three-and-a-half-foot stuffy booth — a tight squeeze for two. The visits can only take place on weekdays from 8am-2pm — no more Christmas or Thanksgiving visits — and worse, no physical contact (Consider what it would be like to have no contact with your loved ones. What if you couldn’t hug or kiss your lover, partner, wife, husband? What would that do to you?) I find myself riddled with guilt when I ask friends to spend $500 to fly across the country, drive three hours (and repeat) for a four-hour non-contact visit. I’m lucky though, having people who will do this. Many of the men here can’t afford it or don’t want to subject their children to this reality.

C) Mail- We can only send out mail once a day and we cannot visit the mail room to send out packages. We are one-hundred-percent reliant on the one staff person who deals with our mail to do so and sending a box home is a laborious procedure. We must leave our envelopes unsealed so that staff can read, copy, scan and send to whatever other agency studies our correspondence. A letter to NYC takes roughly seven to nine days (which should take five). Letters sent abroad, especially those not written in English, could take a month or more — a common complaint of some of my fellow prisoners.

Staff here has an interesting reading of the rules governing legal mail leading to the charge that they open our legal mail (this is the subject of an administrative remedy I filed with the BoP Central Office in Washington DC). The rule states that the lawyer’s name must be clearly identified and that the envelope must say “Special Mail- Open only in the presence of inmates” and yet staff has opened my legal mail that said “Law Offices of Jane Doe” stating that it should have said, “Jane Doe, Attorney at Law”! The staff looks for any reason to disqualify our legal mail as protected and gather intelligence this way. In doing so, they violate the sanctity of the attorney-client confidentiality principle.

Most of my violations have been petty — a package has more than twenty pieces of paper or a friend kindly enclosed stamps. A few instances though amount to censorship and a limiting of political expression and dialogue. See Appendix B for a detailed discussion of these instances.

D) Media Contact- Although requests have been made to interview people in the CMU, none have been granted to date. This is a violation of the spirit of the BoP’s own media policy. There is an imperative on the Bureau’s part to control and ultimately suppress information on the CMU from making it to a mass audience.

Daily Life at the CMU
Neither one of the two CMUs were built for long-term habitation. The Marion CMU was the site of the Secure Housing Unit (SHU), the USP that closed here in 2005. Terre Haute’s CMU is in “D-wing” — the site of the former federal death row.

The CMU was seemingly converted to its current use with the addition of televisions, steel tables, and new wiring and yet it is not suitable for long-term use due to its “open cell” design (i.e. with bars). With 25 prisoners, our movements are restricted to two housing ranges (hallways about 100 by 12 feet); a recreation range where we also eat (consisting of seven cells with a computer, typewriter, barber shop, religious library, social library, art room and recreational equipment); and a small rec yard (all concrete, a lap equals one-eighteenth of a mile, four cages with two basketball hoops, one handball court, a weather awning with tables and some sit-up benches). We are lucky to be visited daily by a resident bird population of doves and blackbirds, and overhead, the occasional hawk or falcon (ironically, as I write this, I overhear warnings from staff that if we continue to feed the birds, we will receive violations). The appearance of the yard with its cages, concrete, and excessive barbed wire has earned it nickname “Little Guantanamo” (of course a punitive unit with seventy-five percent Muslims also contributes to the name as well).

The conditions here are not dire — in fact, the horror stories I have heard over the last two years have convinced me it is far worse at many prisons and yet, I believe it is important to be descriptive and accurate — to dispel fears (about violence, for instance) but also to demonstrate just how different life is for us at the CMU.

There are many things we lack here that other prisons in the federal system have to offer:

1- A residential drug/alcohol program- despite at least one person here having completion of it ordered by the court.

2- Enough jobs for the prisoners here- There is not nearly enough jobs for all the men here and most are extremely low paying.

3- UNICOR- This is Federal Prison Industries which has shops at many federal prisons (including this one outside the CMU). These jobs pay much more, allow men to pay their court fees, restitution and child support and, as the BoP brags, teaches people job skills.

4- Adequate educational opportunities- Until recently, we did not have GED or vocational programs. Due to inmate pressure and persistence, we now have both of those as well as a few prisoner-taught classes but no college courses at all.

5- Access to staff on a daily basis- At other federal prisons, you are able to approach staff members at lunch every day, including the Warden. Here, we get (at most) two quick walk-throughs a week, usually taking place early in the morning. You are often left waiting days to resolve a simple question.

6- Law library access- We have a very small law library here with only twenty-five percent of the books required by law. We can only request books twice weekly and those are only delivered if the other nine hundred prisoners at the adjacent Medium are not using them. We lack Federal Court and Supreme Court reports as well as books on Immigration Law (fifty percent or more of the men here face deportation). This lack of access makes for an arduous and ineffective research path.

7- Computers- We have four computers for our email system (two for reading, one for printing and one that we were told would be for legal but it still isn’t working). Unlike my previous prison, where we had forty computers with a robust computer-class program, or like other prisons that teach a vocational computer course, we have no such thing.

8- Access to general population- Being in an isolation unit makes for a situation in which we cannot have organized sports leagues and tournaments due to not having enough people at all. This may not seem crucial but sports are a very useful diversion from the stress of prison life and separation.

After reading the preceding sections, perhaps like me you are wondering what really is the purpose of the CMU. In short, the SMU is Florence ADX-LITE for those men whose security points are low and present no real problems to staff. From my interactions with the men here, I can say with certainty, that people here are remarkably well-behaved and calm — many without any disciplinary violations. If these men, like myself, don’t get in trouble, and have been in the system for some time, why are we here? Consider my case.

My short time in prison prior to coming to the CMU consisted of two months at MDC Brooklyn and eight months at FCI Sandstone. I had never gotten in trouble and spent my days as a clerk in psychology, working toward a Master’s degree, reading, writing and exercising. My goal was to get closer to home and my loved ones. In April 2008, I filed a “hardship transfer” request due to my mother’s illness and her inability to travel to Minnesota to visit me. I had my team meeting, and my security points were lowered. Weeks later, I was moved to the CMU.

The irony is that I was moved to the CMU to have my communication managed, but what changed in that one year to justify this move? If I was a danger, then why did the BoP house me in a low-security prison? The same applies to many of the men here– some have been in general population for twenty years and then suddenly a need to manage their communication is conjured up. During my pre-CMU time, I had used 3500 phone minutes and sent hundreds of letters. If there was a problem with my communication, shouldn’t the BoP have raised this with me? My notice stating their rationale for placing me here attributed it to me “being a member and leader in the ELF and ALF” and “communicating in code.” But if this is true, then shouldn’t I have been sent to the CMU as soon as I self-reported to prison in July 2007?

The CMUs were crafted and opened under the Bush administration as some misguided attempt to be tough on the “war on terror.” This unit contains many prisoners from cases prosecuted during the hyper-paranoid and over-the-top period after 9/11 and the passage of the USA Patriot Act.44 The number of prosecutions categorized as terrorism-related more than doubled to reach 1,200 in 2002. It seemed that every other week, there was some plot uncovered by overzealous FBI agents — in Lackawanna, NY, Miami, FL, Portland, OR, and Virginia and elsewhere (never mind the illegal wiretaps and unscrupulous people used in these cases). These cases may not be headlines anymore but these men did not go away — they were sent to prison and, when it was politically advantageous for Bush, transferred to the CMUs. The non-Muslim populations of these units (although definitely picked judiciously) were sent there to dispel charges that the CMUs were exclusively Muslim units.

The codified rationale for all prisoners being transferred here are “contact with persons in community require heightened control and reviews” and “your transfer to this facility for greater communication management is necessary to the safe, secure, and orderly function of Bureau institutions…” Should an increase in monitoring of communication mean a decrease in privileges? If the goal is to manage our contact with the outside world, shouldn’t the BoP hire enough staff so that we can maintain the same rights and privileges as other prisoners (since the party line is that we are not here for punishment)? The reality is the conditions, segregation, lack of due process and such are punishment regardless of whether the BoP admits it or not.

Forward!
Where to from here, then? Does the new President and his Attorney General take issue with segregation? Will Obama view the CMU, as he did with Guantanamo Bay, as a horrible legacy of his predecessor and close it? Many people are hopeful for an outcome like that. On April 7th, 2009, Mr. Obama, while in Turkey, said, “The United States will not make war on Islam,” and that he wanted to “extend the hand of friendship to the Muslim world.” While that sounds wonderful, what does that look like in concrete terms? Will he actualize that opinion by closing the CMU? Or will he marry the policy of Bush and condone a secret illegal set of political units for Muslims and activists? What of the men here? Will he transfer us back to normal prisons and review the outrageous prosecutions of many of the CMU detainees? If it can be done with (former) Senator Ted Steven’s case, it can be done here.

While lawsuits have been filed in both Illinois and Indiana federal courts, what is needed urgently is for these units to be dragged out into the open. I am asking for your help and advocacy in dealing with this injustice and the mindset that allows a CMU to exist. Please pursue the resource section at the end of this article and consider doing something. I apologize for the length of this piece — it was suggested to me (by people way smarter than myself) that it would be best to start from the beginning and offer as many details as possible. I hope I gave you a clearer idea of what’s going on here. Thank you for all your support and love — your letters are a bright candle in a sea of darkness.

Why be bothered by horrors of detainees

Con Son Prison Vietnam 1951President Obama is blocking the release of further detainee abuse photos. Would more images of outrages committed against US detainees inflame sentiment against US troops? No doubt. Would more of such photos add nothing to the national dialog? Well… If you consider that the media is still vacillating on the definition of waterboarding, torturers and the lawyers who sanctioned torture are being exempted from prosecution, and war criminals like Dick Cheney are bragging about their participation, maybe there’s room for more dialog.

Journalist Seymour Hersh has seen the additional photographs. He’s even recounted the videos of young Iraqi boy detainees being raped by their captors. Hersh described that the most haunting aspect were the boys’ screams. Barack Obama doesn’t want the American conscience haunted by any such brutalities.